The Dependency
Studies Project
Analysis of dependency, autonomous and other
non-independent governance models
30-8032 Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands 00803
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"Decolonization – What happens to a dream
deferred?"
An
Address to a Forum on Decolonization
University
of Guam
29
October 2015
Carlyle
G. Corbin
Senior
Fellow
Dependency
Studies Project
Introduction
At the outset, I wish to pay my deep
respect to the original peoples of this land.
The theme of this
address is derived from the poem, “What happens to a dream deferred?” authored by Langston Hughes, one of the
leaders of the early 1900s Harlem
Renaissance (1902-1967). The present theme asked the same question about
decolonization.
When we speak of something which has been deferred, we speak
of something that has been postponed, delayed, or ignored for a certain time –
or even indefinitely.
This presentation asks the same question about the dream of
many of us in the territories – an aspiration, really - that we will, one day,
reach the level of full decolonization – even though we are often told that we
have reached it already, that this is all we should ever expect to aspire to.
If you think about it, it is rather amazing
how we have been shifted around, from one colonial power to the next, over the centuries.
Through the struggles of the ancestors against the earliest days of
colonialism, territories worldwide are still working towards the fulfillment of
the dream of the full measure of self-government and a permanent political
status.
Ironically, the inalienable right to self-determination has
been long guaranteed to us through historical commitments made for over a
century by bilateral and multilateral treaties. Together, these commitments
serve as the defining principles of the contemporary decolonization process.
But a fundamental question which I often ask is whether these
commitments made in international law to decolonize the remaining territories
worldwide are taken as seriously as they once were by those nations which
administer territories, such as France, the United Kingdom, or the United
States. Or do they feel that the “rule of law” no longer applies to them - even
as they insist that it applies to everybody else. The phrase “Do as we say, not as we do” comes to
mind.
I also ask the question whether the geo-strategic and geo-economic
interests of those countries which administer territories around the world are more
important than fulfilling their international legal obligations – and moral
obligations - to decolonize the territories they have long held? Observations over
the years events have led me to question whether our decolonization may no
longer be consistent with these geo-strategic and geo-economic interests. I give three examples related to the three
main administering powers:
1. The first example
relates to France. Five million sq. km. of undersea minerals in the waters of French
Polynesia, is a powerful economic incentive for France to refrain from
promoting self-determination for the Ma’ohi Nui people even as it is a legal
obligation under the UN. Charter. Decolonization would restore those resources
to the ownership of the Ma’ohi Nui people.
2. The second example
relates to the United States. To what extent does the U.S. military build-up in
Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI)
affect federal thinking on decolonization? Under a permanent political status
selected by the people, the unilateral federal authority under the territorial
status would give way to a more balanced political relationship of mutual
consent. This is the case with respect to Guam's ongoing referendum process, as
well as for the CNMI if the commonwealth proceeds with its planned political
status review, and moves to a permanent status.
3. The third example
relates to the British. If the stubborn retention of empire by the British in
the Caribbean, and in its occupation of the Malvinas Islands off the coast of Argentina,
were to end, what happens to the British global footprint and the offshore oil
deposits which they presently claim are their own even as they are thousands of
miles away from British shores. And what is the true intent of the Pitcairn
Marine Sanctuary recently announced in the South Pacific?
I suppose that it is sometimes better to know some of the
questions than all of the answers. But these questions continue to linger. The
answers may lie in the realization that any decolonization process in this
early part of the 21st Century must be seen in light of such
geo-strategic interests – and such interests may not be in our interest.
In light of these observations, has the dream of genuine
decolonization become – to use the words
of His Holiness Pope Francis at the United Nations last month - “an unattainable illusion?”
Bob Marley would ask whether it is “a fleeting illusion to be pursued, but never attained.”
Or might it be what the French jazz violinist Jean Luc Ponty
describes as "Lost Illusions"?
For my part, I would question whether the
territories have been lulled into another type of illusion – one that would
have us justify and internalize the status quo. I refer to the “illusion of inclusion” the illusion
that we are “a part of” the United
States even as federal and international law suggest that the political relationship
is referred to by the U.S. Constitution as “territory
or other property.” As one of my University of Guam students Luke Duenas
said in our Governance and
Self-Determination class last Summer,
“We have been living in
the Matrix, and the only way to get out of it is to unplug.”
So, it is from this perspective that I ask the question: Decolonization -
What happens to a dream deferred?”
*****
The International Commitment
If we take a global approach to our
decolonization, it is clear that international law and principles apply to all
countries of the world who signed the U.N Charter in 1945. There is not
supposed to be any exceptionalism in this case.
Last month, the nations of the world commemorated the 70th
anniversary of the United Nations (U.N.)
by unanimously reaffirming those principles of the U.N. Charter. These included
Chapters 1, 11 and 55 which provide firm commitments for the “self-determinations of peoples” (not ‘populations,’ but ‘peoples’- the peoples of the territory, not the people in
the territory).
Article 73 (b) of the
U.N. Charter sets forth the fundamental international legal obligations “to develop self-government to take due
account of the political aspirations of the peoples…”who were recognized as
the native inhabitants in the Treaty of
Paris (regarding Guam and Puerto Rico), the Treaty of Cession (regarding
the Danish West Indies cum U.S. Virgin Islands) and the main human rights
treaties. Self-determination of peoples has been recognized formally by the nations
of the world as a fundamental human right.
Since the U.N. Charter was signed, some 80 territories have been decolonized,
either through independence like the Philippines, full integration like Hawaii (notwithstanding the highly questionable
legality of the annexation of the Hawaiian Kingdom), or free association
like the Federated States of Micronesia, Marshalls and Palau. (These examples coincide with the same three
options of full self-government that would be considered in the upcoming Guam referendum).
But others of us, like Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin
Islands, the CNMI and Puerto Rico have yet to attain the full measure of
self-government attained by these other former territories. A proper
self-governance assessment using the global Self
Governance Indicators would identify where the democratic deficits may lie
in these political status arrangements. Indicators such as political
representation in the federal system, the unilateral nature of federal power,
control of natural resources and many other factors would identify the
democratic deficits of the territorial status, and debunk the myth of political
inclusion.
It can be said that the international legal obligation to
develop full self-government in the territories began at the signing of the
United Nations Charter. However, the commitments to develop genuine
self-government had been made much earlier. Unfortunately, these commitments
have yet to be fully honored, and the dream of decolonization has been
continually deferred. So let us take a closer look at some of those historical
commitments.
Historical Commitments
Some of these commitments were contained in treaties and
other agreements throughout the Pacific. Agreements were made by the early
colonizers with the native inhabitants of Polynesia beginning with the 1878 Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between the indigenous Samoan chiefs and a U.S. military
commander containing certain obligations to respect indigenous traditions
and laws. Also in Polynesia was the 1880 treaty between the French and the indigenous
leadership of Ma’ohi Nui/French Polynesia which made similar commitments.
In both instances, however, these commitments were not
honoured. In the case of French
Polynesia, this actually led to the Franco-Tahitian
War between 1844 and 1846, and
the war in the Leeward Islands between 1888 and 1897.
An enlightening description of this early period of
colonization can be found in an article by former Senator Mark Forbes in the excellent publication “Issues in Guam's Political Development: The Chamorro Perspective.
******
A second historical commitment made to the native inhabitants was
the Treaty of Paris in 1899 and the annexation
of Guam, the Philippines, Cuba and Puerto Rico. For Guam and Puerto Rico, Article IX of the Treaty expressed
the commitment as follows:
“The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants
of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the
(U.S.) Congress.”
Guam and Puerto Rico would go through over a
century of effort in encouraging the U.S. Congress to act on this commitment
–and are still waiting.
A few years after the Treaty of Paris, the U.S. Supreme Court
in the infamous Insular Cases between
1901-05 issued rulings on how to govern the areas acquired as the spoils of the
Spanish American War. These rulings
served to defer the treaty commitments, and effectively legitimized a second
class political status of “un-incorporated
territory”. The Insular Cases confirmed that full constitutional rights did not automatically extend to all areas
under American control. Former Chief Justice of the Puerto Rico Supreme
Court José Trías Monge has written that the Insular
Cases were based on disturbing premises such as:
·
There is nothing wrong when a democracy such
as the United States engages in the business of governing other subjects that
have not participated in their democratic election process.
The resulting military governance in Guam (until the 1950 Organic Act) served to
further defer the Treaty of Paris commitment for the Congress to develop "the civil rights and political status
of the native inhabitants".
Judge Monge observed that the Insular Cases would
be considered 'bizarre' today -
except that the recent unsuccessful lawsuit seeking to declare American Samoans
as U.S. citizens suggest that this thinking is very much alive. The U.S.
Justice Department position in the American Samoa case confirmed that the
federal interpretation of the political status of the territories remains
essentially the same as it did in the days of the Insular Cases. The U.S. Court
of Appeals decision in the American Samoa case acknowledged
the ‘validity’ of a second class political status and a second class statutory
U.S. citizenship that is not guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Political
satirist John Oliver provided the
world with a humorist account of this on an HBO program earlier this year. Several
points made in the court ruling offered
more sobering insights:
“…the framework (of
the Insular Cases) remains both applicable, and of pragmatic use, in assessing
the applicability of rights to unincorporated territories."
*****
“Whatever may be finally decided by
the American people as to the status of these islands and their inhabitants
. . . they are entitled under the principles of the Constitution to be
protected in life, liberty, and property . . . even [if they are] not possessed of
the political rights of citizens of the United States.”)
If a future court decision ultimately strikes down the
Insular Cases, are we prepared for what comes next? If we would no longer be unincorporated,
would Congress do the most logical thing and make us incorporated
territories, by default? And since incorporation is the transition to political
integration (statehood), would such a unilateral action (lawful under the U.S. Territorial Clause) violate our international
right to self-determination - to choose a political status ourselves? Suppose
we don’t want to be put on the track of statehood – which could also mean
joining an existing state?
The unintended consequences of such initiatives must be thoroughly
explored especially before we sign on to initiatives which on the surface may
offer exciting prospects. But the American Samoa case provided us with important
insights on how the federal courts interpret our political status and the
nature of our citizenship. Maybe all of
this will somehow encourage us to unplug from that matrix that Luke Duenas
spoke about. (Should we take the red pill
or the blue pill…?)
If
there is one thing that is certain to me, it is that the description of our
political status from the federal court only confirms the understanding that
such status arrangements were
never meant to be permanent. Given their undemocratic nature, how could they be
considered anything but transitional to a permanent status? It is only through
such a successful transition that the international legally binding commitments
of the federal government under the Treaty of Paris, the Treaty of Cession and
the U.N. Charter would be fulfilled leading to the realization of the dream of decolonization and true democracy.
When Congress gave us the
two organic acts for the Virgin Islands in 1936 (revised in 1954) and for Guam
in 1950, this was seen as a part of
that transition – not as fulfillment of the historical, legally binding
commitments that the Congress was to determine the political status of the
territories. This is because the political status didn’t change with the
organic acts which were designed only to organize the internal structures of
the status quo. – so we went from un-organized,
unincorporated territories to organized,
unincorporated territories. Similar structures were put in place in American
Samoa beginning with the 1950 Department
of Interior Secretarial Order and in the Puerto Rico Commonwealth Constitution of 1952. The political status
of these two territories under the U.S. Territorial Clause did not change as a
result of these internal governance arrangements.
Make no mistake. I
fully acknowledge that the emerging governance structures under territorial
status have been most useful in the preparatory phase of building capacity for eventual
full self-government. I also recognize that these developments resulted from
concerted pressure from the territorial leaders themselves. The critical role
played by the Mau in the 1920s in the
Samoas resulted in Congressional action providing for civilian government. The
courage and spirit of Chief Hurao in Guahan (Guam) during the earlier Spanish
colonial period served as the genesis of later actions including the walk-out by the Guam Congress in 1949 forcing U.S. Congressional
action on an organic act. The important work undertaken by Guam Governors Joe Ada and Carl Gutierrez on
devising a progressive and workable formula for the commonwealth status was
groundbreaking. But in the end, federal support was not extended even as
similar delegated powers envisaged in the Guam proposal were already being
exercised in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
The work of Virgin
Islands Governor Alexander A. Farrelly, under whose administration the only political
status referendum in Virgin Islands history was held, also served to raise the
issue of the political inequalities inherent in the territorial status. All
these efforts and more must be acknowledged with deep respect as building
blocks to the present day struggle for ultimate self-determination. Those
involved in such historic achievements were some of our earlier human rights
defenders. There were similar figures in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands in
the Caribbean; in Tahiti and Noumea in the Pacific, and in other areas of the
world.
But what happened after
the organic acts were conferred upon us by the U.S. Congress was rather
curious. The new transitional structures of unincorporated territory came to
become increasingly seen - and projected - by Washington less as transitional,
and more as legitimate forms of democratic governance. The weakness of the argument favoring this legitimization
lies in the apparent reluctance to formally submit these dependency arrangements for U.N. review and assessment. So the UN dances a sort of minuet around the issue, but
never really addresses it. The beginning of this dependency legitimization
period following the organic acts served to further defer
the Treaty of Paris, Treaty of Cession and U.N. Charter obligations.
A variation on this
theme is contained in the several White House Task Force Reports on Puerto Rico
between 2005 and 2011. These reports confirmed that the permanent options were independence,
free association and integration. The reports recognized the temporary nature
of the political status under the Territorial
Clause of the U.S. Constitution – the clause which gives Congress the
authority “to make all needful rules for territory
or other property of the U.S.” What else could this be but a transitional
status.
But as clear as the
reports were on what was permanent and what was not, there was no sense of urgency to address
these temporary political status arrangements. Rather, the Reports offered a
degree of legitimacy to them by indicating that the territories can remain in
the status quo matrix indefinitely - even as this entails clear political,
social and economic inequality. Sadly, the U.N. is given a rosy narrative in
meetings where the U.N. procedure does not allow for any questions to be raised
- again, the minuet.
On this point, I invoke the words
of President Ronald Reagan that “it may
be worthwhile to find out how images are created, and even more worthwhile to
find out how false images come into being.”
*****
Let us move to the third historical commitment – which
continues to present day. This commitment can be seen in the accumulation of
decades of U.N. resolutions on decolonization with recommended actions to
complete the decolonization process. The most famous of these resolutions was
the Decolonization Declaration of 1960 (1514), and its companion resolution (1541)
which identified and defined the three permanent options of political equality:
independence, free association and integration.
The actions
called for in the resolutions were generally acknowledged by the nations of the
world from the 1960s through 1980s. A number of territories, including those in
the Caribbean and Pacific, proceeded to independence or free association
consistent with these resolutions. But at the beginning of the 1990s, the
process slowed down, with only Timor Leste achieving full self-government since
then. This coincided with thawing of the Cold War and the variation on the
theme that decolonization was a Cold War issue.
Employing
this new strategy, the decolonization process became more complex, and the
countries which administered territories tried hard to convince the world that
the territorial status was an acceptable form of governance - even as it did
not meet the international standards for full self-government. I cite three examples:
-
The first example is where the French signed the Noumea Accord which was a
long self-determination process leading to a referendum for the people of Kanaky/New
Caledonia. The French would later try to manipulate the voter eligibility to
ensure that as many French settlers as possible would be eligible to vote in
the upcoming referendum - even as this violates the Accord. The French now
storm out of the UN Hall whenever the words French Polynesia are uttered, and they ignore their
international legal obligations to provide information to the U.N. on that
territory.
- The second example is where the British adopted several new
territorial modernization policies changing the designation of their
territories from “dependent territories” to “overseas territories”, and changing
the name of the elected head of government from Chief Minister to Premier. British
unilateral power over the territories, however, remained intact. But the
argument put forward is that “as long as
the territories wish to remain British” they will have to contend with the
unilateral British authority. This is projected as ‘self-government.’
-
The third example is where the U.S. argued that the power
granted to the U.S. territories to elect a governor and a non-voting delegate
to one House of the U.S. Congress represents full self-government, and all that
is needed is a constitution to be approved as the final step to legitimize the unincorporated
territorial status. Of course, unilateral federal authority remains unchanged,
including the unilateral application of the Jones
Act to Guam. University of Guam student Michelle
Luzano wrote an excellent class paper last summer on how this affects the
cost of living in Guam. So, had constitutions been adopted, an escape from the
stranglehold of the Jones Act would have been even less likely for Guam even as
it is outside of the U.S. Customs Zone like the Virgin Islands (which is exempt from the Jones Act).
With a constitution under the present political status, it would have been expected
that attempts to remove the territory from the U.N. list of non self-governing
territories (NSGTs) would have been made.
Guam and the Virgin Islands both
tried the ‘constitution first’ route
once and the people said they preferred to settle the political status question
first. The Virgin Islands tried it a number of times – five constitutional
conventions in the Virgin Islands between 1964 and 2012, along with one
political status referendum (1993) – all with inconclusive results. If there is
one thing that could be drawn from the Virgin Islands experience is that the
areas of autonomy identified as important to governing ourselves effectively cannot
be accommodated within the box known as unincorporated territorial status under
the Territorial Clause of the U.S. Constitution. It is a status which only
perpetuates political inequality serving to circumvent, rather than fulfill,
the international commitments for full self-government – serving to further defer
the dream.
So, rather than participate in the
U.N. decolonization proceedings to argue their case for dependency
legitimization, the three major administering powers (France, UK, and US) proceeded
to withdraw from participation in the U.N. Decolonization Committee at the
beginning of the 1990s. Their argument was that the Committee had become
outdated – colonialism was not outdated, according to this thinking - but
rather the committee responsible to recommend ways to bring colonialism to an
end. Meanwhile, General Assembly decolonization resolutions that become international
policy to be followed by all countries are often ignored. This has served to
further defer the dream of real decolonization - despite the objective reality
of the true nature of our political status.
This
analysis also can be applied to other territorial constitutions in Puerto Rico
and American Samoa as they are also subordinate to the U.S. Constitution and
the unilateral applicability of U.S. law. In fact, a 1987 U.S. District Court
ruling regarding the Virgin Islands (upheld by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals) stated that the territorial government "exists... only by the legislative
grace of Congress.” Imagine that. Meanwhile, the autonomy of the CNMI
Commonwealth model has been further
eroded by U.S. court decision upholding the federalization of significant
powers which they thought had been the exclusive jurisdiction of the
commonwealth government under the self-government provisions of the CNMI
Covenant.
Not to be undone, there is also a French
version of colonial legitimization which finds so-called “autonomy statutes” given to territories like French Polynesia. But the application of the global Self-Governance Indicators revealed that
this French version of the organic acts is anything but autonomous. The Netherlands
has their own version of 'partial integration', while holding on to unilateral
power in this new variation of dependency arrangements which has, thus far,
escaped U.N. jurisdiction. We could go
on.
Conclusion
We have covered a range of
decolonization issues, including methods and strategies which have circumvented
the process thus far. I will close by examining why I think that those
countries which administer territories might be ignoring their international
obligations.
I reiterate my earlier suggestions
that the overarching reason for the resistance to decolonization is motivated by
geo-strategic and geo-economic considerations. As far back as 1980,
President Jimmy Carter announced a formal territorial policy which expressed
that "all options for political
development should be open to the people of the insular territories" (with
the caveat) if economically feasible and consistent with U.S.
national security interests.” (emphasis
added). So we were told then that we had a sort of ‘qualified’ right to
self-determination – as long as this ‘right’ did not impact on U.S. ‘interests.’
Not surprisingly, there
is currently little evidence today of any proactive an genuine federal approach
to preparing the U.S. territories for full self-government consistent with international legal
obligations of States which administer territories. On the contrary, continued
promotion of dependency legitimization has been the order of the day for some
time. This preserves the status quo
unilateral federal power which fits nicely with geo-strategic and geo-economic
interests. Such considerations are formidable for the Pacific territories given
the preoccupation of the foreign and defense policy interests in Washington
over the expansion of Chinese influence in Asia.
For our part, it is only through a permanent political status that more
balanced arrangements can take place in
framing and regulating such activities in the territories in this part of the world. The prevailing
defense treaties between the U.S. and the Philippines or Japan, respectively, is
indication of a balanced approach between independent countries through mutual
agreement.
In the case of the Freely Associated States of Marshall Islands, Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia, such
activities are regulated by the terms of the agreement contained in the
respective compacts of free association.
Of course, such balance is absent under territorial status where
the authority is exercised unilaterally - albeit with quite
sophisticated consultation procedures preceding the decision (public hearings,
etc.). But as Guam Governor Joe Ada
used to say, ‘mutual consultation is not
the same thing as mutual consent.’
I would argue that the substantive
issues between U.S. territories and the U.S. government, including those
geo-strategic considerations, might be better accommodated through mutual
agreements under free association, through political integration (statehood)
where there is equal political power (and obligations) in the U.S. system, or
through independence where relations are defined by international treaty.
These are the 21st century
solutions to ending the deferral of the dream of decolonization. This would render
irrelevant the Insular Cases since there would be no more “territories or other property” at the ‘disposal’ of the U.S. Congress. Peoples should have never been so
categorized anyway. As long as we
remain under the Territorial Clause of the US Constitution, however, power will
always be elsewhere, and will continue to be exercised unilaterally by a
Congress in which we have no vote, and by a President for whom we cannot vote.
But,
again, the answer does not lie merely in the singular approach of attacking the
applicability of the Insular Cases if we have not examined the possible
implications. I would argue that the answer does lie in a proper process of
self-determination under the rules of international law. This would render
irrelevant the Insular Cases, the applicability of the Territorial Clause, and
the unincorporated territorial status. They should all be sent to the dustbin
of history.
We may reach this determination at
different times in our political and constitutional evolution. But if we remain
in the status quo – even a modernized version of it - it should be understood
that we would have not achieved full self-government which can only come
by way of a permanent political status.
However, as our moderator Raymond Lujan
wrote for a paper in our class last summer, we are faced with “a lax disposition that the U.S. has towards assisting with an educational
program for self- determination and political status options - actions which they are
obligated to do.” Indeed, sustained public education on these issues, in the fullest of dimensions, is
what is needed to enhance our chances to make an informed decision on our political
future based on “Equal Rights and Justice”,
in the words of the late Reggae Artist Peter
Tosh.
Along the path to self-government and
democratic free will, we often revert to the perceived comfort of the
dependency condition. But if we are complacent, then we disgrace the ancestors
and deserve only the future which would be dictated to us – or no future, at
all as a people. History forgets those, first, who forget themselves.
Thank you.
