For the Record
United Nations Decisions adopted by the General Assembly
during its fifty-seventh session
10 September – 20 December 2002
General Assembly Official Records, Fifty-seventh Session
Supplement No. 49 (A/57/49)
57/525. Military Activities and Arrangements by Colonial Powers in Territories under their administration
At its 73rd plenary meeting, on 11 December 2002, the General Assembly adopted the following Decision based on the recommendation of the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee):
“The General Assembly,
Having considered the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to an item on the agenda of the Special Committee entitled ‘Military activities and arrangements by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration’ and,
Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and all other relevant resolutions and decisions of the United Nations relating to military activities in colonial and Non-Self-Governing Territories,
(The General Assembly)
Reaffirms its strong conviction that military bases and installations in the Territories concerned could constitute an obstacle to the exercise by the people of those Territories of their right to self-determination, and reiterates its strong views that existing bases and installations, which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, should be withdrawn.
“2. Aware of the presence of such bases and installations in some of those Territories, the General Assembly urges the administering Powers concerned to continue to take all necessary measures not to involve those Territories in any offensive acts or interference against other States
“3. Reiterates its concern that military activities and arrangements by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration might run counter to the rights and interests of the colonial peoples concerned, especially their right to self-determination and independence. The Assembly once again calls upon the administering Powers concerned to terminate such activities and to eliminate such military bases in compliance with its relevant resolutions. Alternative sources of livelihood for the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories should be provided.
“4. Reiterates that the colonial and Non-Self-Governing Territories and areas adjacent thereto should not be used for nuclear testing, dumping of nuclear wastes or deployment of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.
“5. Deplores the continued alienation of land in colonial and Non-Self-Governing Territories, particularly in the small island Territories of the Pacific and Caribbean regions, for military installations. The large-scale utilization of the local resources for this purpose could adversely affect the economic development of the Territories concerned.
“6. Takes note of the decision of some of the administering Powers to close or downsize some of those military bases in the Non-Self-Governing Territories.
“7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to inform world public opinion of those military activities and arrangements in colonial and Non-Self-Governing Territories which constitute an obstacle to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
“8. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to continue to examine this question and to report thereon to the Assembly at its fifty-eighth session.”
15 February 2010
14 February 2010
Haiti in Proper Historical Context
The Hate and the Quake
by Sir Hilary Beckles
Pro-Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the Cave Hill Campus
University of the West Indies
Barbados
Nations News
Barbados
17 Jan. 2010
The University of the West Indies is in the process of conceiving how best to deliver a major conference on the theme Rethinking And Rebuilding Haiti. I am very keen to provide an input into this exercise because for too long there has been a popular perception that somehow the Haitian nation-building project, launched on January 1, 1804, has failed on account of mismanagement, ineptitude, corruption.
Buried beneath the rubble of imperial propaganda, out of both Western Europe and the United States, is the evidence which shows that Haiti's independence was defeated by an aggressive North-Atlantic alliance that could not imagine their world inhabited by a free regime of Africans as representatives of the newly emerging democracy. The evidence is striking, especially in the context of France.
The Haitians fought for their freedom and won, as did the Americans fifty years earlier. The Americans declared their independence and crafted an extraordinary constitution that set out a clear message about the value of humanity and the right to freedom, justice, and liberty. In the midst of this brilliant discourse, they chose to retain slavery as the basis of the new nation state. The founding fathers therefore could not see beyond race, as the free state was built on a slavery foundation. The water was poisoned in the well; the Americans went back to the battlefield a century later to resolve the fact that slavery and freedom could not comfortably co-exist in the same place.
The French, also, declared freedom, fraternity and equality as the new philosophies of their national transformation and gave the modern world a tremendous progressive boost by so doing. They abolished slavery, but Napoleon Bonaparte could not imagine the republic without slavery and targeted the Haitians for a new, more intense regime of slavery. The British agreed, as did the Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese. All were linked in communion over the 500 000 Blacks in Haiti, the most populous and prosperous Caribbean colony. As the jewel of the Caribbean, they all wanted to get their hands on it. With a massive slave base, the English, French and Dutch salivated over owning it - and the people.
The people won a ten-year war, the bloodiest in modern history, and declared their independence. Every other country in the Americas was based on slavery. Haiti was freedom, and proceeded to place in its 1805 Independence Constitution that any person of African descent who arrived on its shores would be declared free, and a citizen of the republic. For the first time since slavery had commenced, Blacks were the subjects of mass freedom and citizenship in a nation.
The French refused to recognise Haiti's independence and declared it an illegal pariah state. The Americans, whom the Haitians looked to in solidarity as their mentor in independence, refused to recognise them, and offered solidarity instead to the French. The British, who were negotiating with the French to obtain the ownership title to Haiti, also moved in solidarity, as did every other nation-state the Western world.
Haiti was isolated at birth - ostracised and denied access to world trade, finance, and institutional development. It was the most vicious example of national strangulation recorded in modern history. The Cubans, at least, have had Russia, China, and Vietnam. The Haitians were alone from inception. The crumbling began.
Then came 1825; the moment of full truth. The republic is celebrating its 21st anniversary. There is national euphoria in the streets of Port-au-Prince. The economy is bankrupt; the political leadership isolated. The cabinet took the decision that the state of affairs could not continue. The country had to find a way to be inserted back into the world economy. The French government was invited to a summit.
Officials arrived and told the Haitian government that they were willing to recognise the country as a sovereign nation but it would have to pay compensation and reparation in exchange. The Haitians, with backs to the wall, agreed to pay the French. The French government sent a team of accountants and actuaries into Haiti in order to place a value on all lands, all physical assets, the 500,000 citizens were who formerly enslaved, animals, and all other commercial properties and services. The sums amounted to 150 million gold francs. Haiti was told to pay this reparation to France in return for national recognition.
The Haitian government agreed; payments began immediately. Members of the Cabinet were also valued because they had been enslaved people before independence. Thus began the systematic destruction of the Republic of Haiti. The French government bled the nation and rendered it a failed state. It was a merciless exploitation that was designed and guaranteed to collapse the Haitian economy and society.
Haiti was forced to pay this sum until 1922 when the last instalment was made. During the long 19th century, the payment to France amounted to up to 70 per cent of the country's foreign exchange earnings.
Jamaica today pays up to 70 per cent in order to service its international and domestic debt. Haiti was crushed by this debt payment. It descended into financial and social chaos.
The republic did not stand a chance. France was enriched and it took pleasure from the fact that having been defeated by Haitians on the battlefield, it had won on the field of finance. In the years when the coffee crops failed, or the sugar yield was down, the Haitian government borrowed on the French money market at double the going interest rate in order to repay the French government.
When the Americans invaded the country in the early 20th century, one of the reasons offered was to assist the French in collecting its reparations.
The collapse of the Haitian nation resides at the feet of France and America, especially. These two nations betrayed, failed, and destroyed the dream that was Haiti; crushed to dust in an effort to destroy the flower of freedom and the seed of justice. Haiti did not fail. It was destroyed by two of the most powerful nations on earth, both of which continue to have a primary interest in its current condition.
The sudden quake has come in the aftermath of summers of hate. In many ways the quake has been less destructive than the hate. Human life was snuffed out by the quake, while the hate has been a long and inhumane suffocation - a crime against humanity.
During the 2001 UN Conference on Race in Durban, South Africa, strong representation was made to the French government to repay the 150 million francs. The value of this amount was estimated by financial actuaries as US$21 billion. This sum of capital could rebuild Haiti and place it in a position to re-engage the modern world. It was illegally extracted from the Haitian people and should be repaid.
It is stolen wealth. In so doing, France could discharge its moral obligation to the Haitian people.
For a nation that prides itself in the celebration of modern diplomacy, France, in order to exist with the moral authority of this diplomacy in this post-modern world, should do the just and legal thing. Such an act at the outset of this century would open the door for a sophisticated interface of past and present, and set the Haitian nation free at last.
by Sir Hilary Beckles
Pro-Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the Cave Hill Campus
University of the West Indies
Barbados
Nations News
Barbados
17 Jan. 2010
The University of the West Indies is in the process of conceiving how best to deliver a major conference on the theme Rethinking And Rebuilding Haiti. I am very keen to provide an input into this exercise because for too long there has been a popular perception that somehow the Haitian nation-building project, launched on January 1, 1804, has failed on account of mismanagement, ineptitude, corruption.
Buried beneath the rubble of imperial propaganda, out of both Western Europe and the United States, is the evidence which shows that Haiti's independence was defeated by an aggressive North-Atlantic alliance that could not imagine their world inhabited by a free regime of Africans as representatives of the newly emerging democracy. The evidence is striking, especially in the context of France.
The Haitians fought for their freedom and won, as did the Americans fifty years earlier. The Americans declared their independence and crafted an extraordinary constitution that set out a clear message about the value of humanity and the right to freedom, justice, and liberty. In the midst of this brilliant discourse, they chose to retain slavery as the basis of the new nation state. The founding fathers therefore could not see beyond race, as the free state was built on a slavery foundation. The water was poisoned in the well; the Americans went back to the battlefield a century later to resolve the fact that slavery and freedom could not comfortably co-exist in the same place.
The French, also, declared freedom, fraternity and equality as the new philosophies of their national transformation and gave the modern world a tremendous progressive boost by so doing. They abolished slavery, but Napoleon Bonaparte could not imagine the republic without slavery and targeted the Haitians for a new, more intense regime of slavery. The British agreed, as did the Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese. All were linked in communion over the 500 000 Blacks in Haiti, the most populous and prosperous Caribbean colony. As the jewel of the Caribbean, they all wanted to get their hands on it. With a massive slave base, the English, French and Dutch salivated over owning it - and the people.
The people won a ten-year war, the bloodiest in modern history, and declared their independence. Every other country in the Americas was based on slavery. Haiti was freedom, and proceeded to place in its 1805 Independence Constitution that any person of African descent who arrived on its shores would be declared free, and a citizen of the republic. For the first time since slavery had commenced, Blacks were the subjects of mass freedom and citizenship in a nation.
The French refused to recognise Haiti's independence and declared it an illegal pariah state. The Americans, whom the Haitians looked to in solidarity as their mentor in independence, refused to recognise them, and offered solidarity instead to the French. The British, who were negotiating with the French to obtain the ownership title to Haiti, also moved in solidarity, as did every other nation-state the Western world.
Haiti was isolated at birth - ostracised and denied access to world trade, finance, and institutional development. It was the most vicious example of national strangulation recorded in modern history. The Cubans, at least, have had Russia, China, and Vietnam. The Haitians were alone from inception. The crumbling began.
Then came 1825; the moment of full truth. The republic is celebrating its 21st anniversary. There is national euphoria in the streets of Port-au-Prince. The economy is bankrupt; the political leadership isolated. The cabinet took the decision that the state of affairs could not continue. The country had to find a way to be inserted back into the world economy. The French government was invited to a summit.
Officials arrived and told the Haitian government that they were willing to recognise the country as a sovereign nation but it would have to pay compensation and reparation in exchange. The Haitians, with backs to the wall, agreed to pay the French. The French government sent a team of accountants and actuaries into Haiti in order to place a value on all lands, all physical assets, the 500,000 citizens were who formerly enslaved, animals, and all other commercial properties and services. The sums amounted to 150 million gold francs. Haiti was told to pay this reparation to France in return for national recognition.
The Haitian government agreed; payments began immediately. Members of the Cabinet were also valued because they had been enslaved people before independence. Thus began the systematic destruction of the Republic of Haiti. The French government bled the nation and rendered it a failed state. It was a merciless exploitation that was designed and guaranteed to collapse the Haitian economy and society.
Haiti was forced to pay this sum until 1922 when the last instalment was made. During the long 19th century, the payment to France amounted to up to 70 per cent of the country's foreign exchange earnings.
Jamaica today pays up to 70 per cent in order to service its international and domestic debt. Haiti was crushed by this debt payment. It descended into financial and social chaos.
The republic did not stand a chance. France was enriched and it took pleasure from the fact that having been defeated by Haitians on the battlefield, it had won on the field of finance. In the years when the coffee crops failed, or the sugar yield was down, the Haitian government borrowed on the French money market at double the going interest rate in order to repay the French government.
When the Americans invaded the country in the early 20th century, one of the reasons offered was to assist the French in collecting its reparations.
The collapse of the Haitian nation resides at the feet of France and America, especially. These two nations betrayed, failed, and destroyed the dream that was Haiti; crushed to dust in an effort to destroy the flower of freedom and the seed of justice. Haiti did not fail. It was destroyed by two of the most powerful nations on earth, both of which continue to have a primary interest in its current condition.
The sudden quake has come in the aftermath of summers of hate. In many ways the quake has been less destructive than the hate. Human life was snuffed out by the quake, while the hate has been a long and inhumane suffocation - a crime against humanity.
During the 2001 UN Conference on Race in Durban, South Africa, strong representation was made to the French government to repay the 150 million francs. The value of this amount was estimated by financial actuaries as US$21 billion. This sum of capital could rebuild Haiti and place it in a position to re-engage the modern world. It was illegally extracted from the Haitian people and should be repaid.
It is stolen wealth. In so doing, France could discharge its moral obligation to the Haitian people.
For a nation that prides itself in the celebration of modern diplomacy, France, in order to exist with the moral authority of this diplomacy in this post-modern world, should do the just and legal thing. Such an act at the outset of this century would open the door for a sophisticated interface of past and present, and set the Haitian nation free at last.
11 February 2010
American Samoa Political Status Discussions
Territorial discussions on political future conducted in Samoan
Samoa News
By Fili Sagapolutele fili@samoanews.com
The government launched this week the first two awareness programs to educate the public on various issues dealing with the constitution and the territory’s political system before the Constitutional Convention is called in June. Both programs are in Samoan, without English translations.
Gov. Togiola Tulafono on his weekend radio program announced the outreach program to begin this week saying it will focus on the current constitution as well as other issues to assist American Samoa in preparation for the convention.
The first 30-minute program was aired Tuesday night on KVZK-TV with a roundtable discussion that included the Governor, Secretary of Samoan Affairs Tufele Li’amatua, Constitution Review Office executive director Afoa Moega Lutu and Fofo I.F. Sunia. Tufele was the chairman of the Future Political Status Study Commission (FPSSC) and Fofo was the executive director of the FPSSC.
Togiola said Tuesday night on KVZK that the first program focused on the two deeds of cessions— one for Tutuila and Aunu’u and the other for the Manu’a Island group. He said the two separate deeds of cession have been the subject of debates and questions in the past.
Tuesday night’s program touched on some interesting background history of Manu’a, and the move by the U.S. government, which kept asking then-King Tuimanu’a for his island kingdom to be part of the United States, joining Tutuila and Aunu’u.
KVZK-TV said part two of the program, taped Tuesday morning, was to air last night.
The discussions are considered to be of great interest— especially to help students and others become more familiar with the history which led to this territory becoming an American possession. However, they are in the Samoan language, with no English translation.
During his radio program, Togiola said the constitutional convention is a very important milestone in the territory’s history and public input will help pave the future of American Samoa. He said full community participation is needed. The Governor said the FPSSC has already done its work, which will guide the constitutional convention.
(It should be noted that the FPSSC Report is in English and Samoan.)
In his State of the Territory address last month at the Fono, Togiola said the constitutional convention will be held on the third and fourth weeks of June, which is timed with the opening in July of the 4th regular session of the Fono to present any recommendations and findings for lawmakers’ review and consideration.
He said American Samoa’s relationship with the Untied States requires re-examination. “We should be very worried about the march towards re-federalization of American Samoa that we see today here on our soil as well as other insular areas,” Togiola told lawmakers. “We need to make some hard decisions some time as to our political future, and I believe that time is now.”
The Governor also said that there will be public service announcements and town hall meetings that will take place between now and June and urged everyone in the territory to get involved.
He encourage participation by families, villages and churches; adding that ASG officials will make public appearances to explain the process and enlighten local residents as to the choices for American Samoa’s political future.
“It is anticipated that after the main convention, a youth forum will be impaneled to review the outcomes of the Convention at the same time the Fono will be examining the final proposals. We expect these to all happen this year,” he said.
The Governor will soon be announcing members of the Constitutional Review Board.
Samoa News
By Fili Sagapolutele fili@samoanews.com
The government launched this week the first two awareness programs to educate the public on various issues dealing with the constitution and the territory’s political system before the Constitutional Convention is called in June. Both programs are in Samoan, without English translations.
Gov. Togiola Tulafono on his weekend radio program announced the outreach program to begin this week saying it will focus on the current constitution as well as other issues to assist American Samoa in preparation for the convention.
The first 30-minute program was aired Tuesday night on KVZK-TV with a roundtable discussion that included the Governor, Secretary of Samoan Affairs Tufele Li’amatua, Constitution Review Office executive director Afoa Moega Lutu and Fofo I.F. Sunia. Tufele was the chairman of the Future Political Status Study Commission (FPSSC) and Fofo was the executive director of the FPSSC.
Togiola said Tuesday night on KVZK that the first program focused on the two deeds of cessions— one for Tutuila and Aunu’u and the other for the Manu’a Island group. He said the two separate deeds of cession have been the subject of debates and questions in the past.
Tuesday night’s program touched on some interesting background history of Manu’a, and the move by the U.S. government, which kept asking then-King Tuimanu’a for his island kingdom to be part of the United States, joining Tutuila and Aunu’u.
KVZK-TV said part two of the program, taped Tuesday morning, was to air last night.
The discussions are considered to be of great interest— especially to help students and others become more familiar with the history which led to this territory becoming an American possession. However, they are in the Samoan language, with no English translation.
During his radio program, Togiola said the constitutional convention is a very important milestone in the territory’s history and public input will help pave the future of American Samoa. He said full community participation is needed. The Governor said the FPSSC has already done its work, which will guide the constitutional convention.
(It should be noted that the FPSSC Report is in English and Samoan.)
In his State of the Territory address last month at the Fono, Togiola said the constitutional convention will be held on the third and fourth weeks of June, which is timed with the opening in July of the 4th regular session of the Fono to present any recommendations and findings for lawmakers’ review and consideration.
He said American Samoa’s relationship with the Untied States requires re-examination. “We should be very worried about the march towards re-federalization of American Samoa that we see today here on our soil as well as other insular areas,” Togiola told lawmakers. “We need to make some hard decisions some time as to our political future, and I believe that time is now.”
The Governor also said that there will be public service announcements and town hall meetings that will take place between now and June and urged everyone in the territory to get involved.
He encourage participation by families, villages and churches; adding that ASG officials will make public appearances to explain the process and enlighten local residents as to the choices for American Samoa’s political future.
“It is anticipated that after the main convention, a youth forum will be impaneled to review the outcomes of the Convention at the same time the Fono will be examining the final proposals. We expect these to all happen this year,” he said.
The Governor will soon be announcing members of the Constitutional Review Board.
08 February 2010
Bermuda Proposes National Service Programme
Premier's Innovative Plan Aimed to Assist Youth
The National Service Programme is designed to provide opportunities for every young Bermudian to contribute meaningfully to our society and broaden their scope through mentoring younger peers and assisting the elderly.
Section 1
The Department for National Service
1. The Department for National Service would be the headquarters and place of register for the National Service Programme. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Labour, Home Affairs and Housing, the Department would be headed by a Director who would answer directly to the Permanent Secretary. The Director would be responsible for the strategic and policy direction as well as the management, administration and delivery of the programme.
The Department would establish and maintain a database of all participating organizations and active national service enrollees. In addition to the Director, there would be an Administrative Officer/Assistant and Technical Support Officers. Full post duties and responsibilities are to be determined. The primary responsibilities of the Department would be:
a) Management and administration of the programme;
b) Recruitment and screening of National Service providers; and
c) Monitoring, reporting, enforcement, funding and adjustment of programme delivery.
2. The Department would work in conjunction with public schools, the Bermuda College, community centres, hospitals, the Centre on Philanthropy, rest homes, rehabilitation agencies, youth groups, sports programmes, and other organizations that may provide outreach to young people, including youth with disabilities. The Director would be responsible for duties which include, but are not limited to recruitment,
screening, monitoring and compliance.
3. The responsibility of the Recruitment and Screening Unit within the Department would be to:
a) Act as a repository for community services and programmes;
b) Educate and raise awareness about the need to give back to the community;
c) Invite and solicit submissions from agencies and organizations who qualify;
d) Promote national service by advertising benefits and advantages of participating in the programme;
e) Act as the sign-up centre for national service activities;
f) Assess and place applicants in approved programmes; and
g) Develop additional incentive programmes.
4. The responsibility of the Compliance Unit would be to:
a) Keep a register follow-up on those who have registered for National Service from the age of 24 to 30 years;
b) Keep records on those who have set aside national service to pursue tertiary education;
c) Acknowledge those who have completed their time served; and
d) Continuously monitor and evaluate the programme operations.
Compliance
5. Compliance with the National Service is goal and incentive oriented.
Section 2
Eligibility
6. All male and female Bermudians are eligible until the age of 30 but they must make a commitment no later than their 28th birthday.
7. All persons who choose to commit to this programme must complete a requirement of 16 hours of service per month for a total period of two years in order to qualify for the benefits.
8. Except for mental or physical illness, where it is determined that an individual is unfit to serve in the National Service; he/she may be reassigned to other community service alternatives to be determined.
9. It is proposed that individuals having served (12) twelve months or more in the Regiment may request a transfer to the National Service Programme, pending approval from the Bermuda Regiment. As the commitment to the Bermuda Regiment is also of national significance, this would hinge upon the supplemental number of recruits available to fill that spot.
Vetting
10. Once registered for the national service, individuals must go through a qualifying screening process to ensure that the safety and best interest of all participants are protected. These measures would include but are not limited to:
a) police and court background checks;
b) physical and mental health examinations.
11. If a candidate seeks placement by the Department, screening for level of education, vocational training, and professional work experience would be conducted. In addition, candidates may notify the programme if they have a disability or religious affiliation that would impact their placement in certain programmes.
Section 3
National Service Programme Criteria
12. The National Service Programme shall be aimed at nurturing an individual’s skills and interests in a manner that is beneficial to Bermuda and its people. This is consistent with both developing career goals and further assisting in communities after the period of service is complete.
13. The National Service Programme shall:
a) Meet an identified need in the participant;
b) Provide a meaningful community benefit; and
c) Encourage collaboration among young adults through the sharing of knowledge and talents.
14. Individuals may either select an activity of their choosing involving youth or seniors, or they may seek to be referred by the National Service Department. Subject to the Department’s approval, national service may include, but is not limited to:
a) Tutoring core subjects in the education system or in an educational programme;
b) Provision of professional advice by those who are in the health, legal or financial sector about subjects such as money management, civil rights, and nutrition;
c) Coaching youth or holding an office in sports programmes;
d) Serving on private or Government Boards that involve or relate to youth or seniors;
e) Serving as a volunteer to youth or senior agencies/organizations;
f) Working on project proposals from various organizations involving youth or seniors; and
g) Serving as a resource for the Department of National Service by assuming leadership responsibilities as delegated by staff, i.e. coordinating/leading various volunteer activities.
15. Subject to the Department’s approval, those who are between the ages of 24 and 30 who already serve in a volunteer capacity may continue in that capacity.
16. Those who already serve in a voluntary mentoring, coaching or professional advisory capacity would qualify for national service hours as determined by the National Service Department.
17. Service to organizations for profit, to labour unions or to organizations with political affiliations will not count toward National Service.
Section 4
Processes for accommodating National Service
Public Sector
18. Government and Quango organizations would allow employees to train and mentor young people giving them an insight into a future career, all the while allowing employees to gain their national service hours.
19. The public sector would be encouraged to give their employees a minimum of one (1) hour of service per month from their work time in order to assist them in carrying out national service activities within the community.
Private Sector
20. Businesses within the private sector would allow those who qualify to gain their national service hours by training and mentoring their younger peers so that they may gain practical knowledge of businesses in Bermuda’s economic sector.
21. Businesses would be encouraged to give their employees a minimum of one (1) hour of service per month from their work time in order to assist them in carrying out national service activities within the community
Bermuda College
22. The Bermuda College would make national service opportunities available to students which shall include college-based volunteer programmes already implemented
on campus, i.e. tutoring, maintenance, sports programs, events held on campus, and outreach initiatives.
Co-op Study Programme
23. Students certifying in programmes such as wood work, electronics, motor mechanics and computer technology at the Bermuda College would gain service hour credit for tutoring in maintenance/technical programmes within schools.
Section 5
Incentives for those providing National Service
24. The following are proposed incentives to offer participants during and/or once national service is completed:
a) Free public transportation;
b) One of criteria for Government Further Education awards;
c) Low interest bank loans;
d) Discount card packages from various retailers;
e) Discounts at TCD on licensing fees;
f) Public recognition once service is completed;
g) Badges/certificates of completion;
h) Supportive organizations will be eligible for benefits.
The National Service Programme is designed to provide opportunities for every young Bermudian to contribute meaningfully to our society and broaden their scope through mentoring younger peers and assisting the elderly.
Section 1
The Department for National Service
1. The Department for National Service would be the headquarters and place of register for the National Service Programme. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Labour, Home Affairs and Housing, the Department would be headed by a Director who would answer directly to the Permanent Secretary. The Director would be responsible for the strategic and policy direction as well as the management, administration and delivery of the programme.
The Department would establish and maintain a database of all participating organizations and active national service enrollees. In addition to the Director, there would be an Administrative Officer/Assistant and Technical Support Officers. Full post duties and responsibilities are to be determined. The primary responsibilities of the Department would be:
a) Management and administration of the programme;
b) Recruitment and screening of National Service providers; and
c) Monitoring, reporting, enforcement, funding and adjustment of programme delivery.
2. The Department would work in conjunction with public schools, the Bermuda College, community centres, hospitals, the Centre on Philanthropy, rest homes, rehabilitation agencies, youth groups, sports programmes, and other organizations that may provide outreach to young people, including youth with disabilities. The Director would be responsible for duties which include, but are not limited to recruitment,
screening, monitoring and compliance.
3. The responsibility of the Recruitment and Screening Unit within the Department would be to:
a) Act as a repository for community services and programmes;
b) Educate and raise awareness about the need to give back to the community;
c) Invite and solicit submissions from agencies and organizations who qualify;
d) Promote national service by advertising benefits and advantages of participating in the programme;
e) Act as the sign-up centre for national service activities;
f) Assess and place applicants in approved programmes; and
g) Develop additional incentive programmes.
4. The responsibility of the Compliance Unit would be to:
a) Keep a register follow-up on those who have registered for National Service from the age of 24 to 30 years;
b) Keep records on those who have set aside national service to pursue tertiary education;
c) Acknowledge those who have completed their time served; and
d) Continuously monitor and evaluate the programme operations.
Compliance
5. Compliance with the National Service is goal and incentive oriented.
Section 2
Eligibility
6. All male and female Bermudians are eligible until the age of 30 but they must make a commitment no later than their 28th birthday.
7. All persons who choose to commit to this programme must complete a requirement of 16 hours of service per month for a total period of two years in order to qualify for the benefits.
8. Except for mental or physical illness, where it is determined that an individual is unfit to serve in the National Service; he/she may be reassigned to other community service alternatives to be determined.
9. It is proposed that individuals having served (12) twelve months or more in the Regiment may request a transfer to the National Service Programme, pending approval from the Bermuda Regiment. As the commitment to the Bermuda Regiment is also of national significance, this would hinge upon the supplemental number of recruits available to fill that spot.
Vetting
10. Once registered for the national service, individuals must go through a qualifying screening process to ensure that the safety and best interest of all participants are protected. These measures would include but are not limited to:
a) police and court background checks;
b) physical and mental health examinations.
11. If a candidate seeks placement by the Department, screening for level of education, vocational training, and professional work experience would be conducted. In addition, candidates may notify the programme if they have a disability or religious affiliation that would impact their placement in certain programmes.
Section 3
National Service Programme Criteria
12. The National Service Programme shall be aimed at nurturing an individual’s skills and interests in a manner that is beneficial to Bermuda and its people. This is consistent with both developing career goals and further assisting in communities after the period of service is complete.
13. The National Service Programme shall:
a) Meet an identified need in the participant;
b) Provide a meaningful community benefit; and
c) Encourage collaboration among young adults through the sharing of knowledge and talents.
14. Individuals may either select an activity of their choosing involving youth or seniors, or they may seek to be referred by the National Service Department. Subject to the Department’s approval, national service may include, but is not limited to:
a) Tutoring core subjects in the education system or in an educational programme;
b) Provision of professional advice by those who are in the health, legal or financial sector about subjects such as money management, civil rights, and nutrition;
c) Coaching youth or holding an office in sports programmes;
d) Serving on private or Government Boards that involve or relate to youth or seniors;
e) Serving as a volunteer to youth or senior agencies/organizations;
f) Working on project proposals from various organizations involving youth or seniors; and
g) Serving as a resource for the Department of National Service by assuming leadership responsibilities as delegated by staff, i.e. coordinating/leading various volunteer activities.
15. Subject to the Department’s approval, those who are between the ages of 24 and 30 who already serve in a volunteer capacity may continue in that capacity.
16. Those who already serve in a voluntary mentoring, coaching or professional advisory capacity would qualify for national service hours as determined by the National Service Department.
17. Service to organizations for profit, to labour unions or to organizations with political affiliations will not count toward National Service.
Section 4
Processes for accommodating National Service
Public Sector
18. Government and Quango organizations would allow employees to train and mentor young people giving them an insight into a future career, all the while allowing employees to gain their national service hours.
19. The public sector would be encouraged to give their employees a minimum of one (1) hour of service per month from their work time in order to assist them in carrying out national service activities within the community.
Private Sector
20. Businesses within the private sector would allow those who qualify to gain their national service hours by training and mentoring their younger peers so that they may gain practical knowledge of businesses in Bermuda’s economic sector.
21. Businesses would be encouraged to give their employees a minimum of one (1) hour of service per month from their work time in order to assist them in carrying out national service activities within the community
Bermuda College
22. The Bermuda College would make national service opportunities available to students which shall include college-based volunteer programmes already implemented
on campus, i.e. tutoring, maintenance, sports programs, events held on campus, and outreach initiatives.
Co-op Study Programme
23. Students certifying in programmes such as wood work, electronics, motor mechanics and computer technology at the Bermuda College would gain service hour credit for tutoring in maintenance/technical programmes within schools.
Section 5
Incentives for those providing National Service
24. The following are proposed incentives to offer participants during and/or once national service is completed:
a) Free public transportation;
b) One of criteria for Government Further Education awards;
c) Low interest bank loans;
d) Discount card packages from various retailers;
e) Discounts at TCD on licensing fees;
f) Public recognition once service is completed;
g) Badges/certificates of completion;
h) Supportive organizations will be eligible for benefits.
07 February 2010
The Caribbean in the New World Order
By Benito Wheatley
Benito Wheatley is an Analyst at the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in Washington, DC and a Researcher for the publication ‘International Affairs Forum,’ produced by the Centre for International Affairs in Arlington, Virginia. For comments or questions he may be contacted at bwheatley@ia-forum.org
Caribbean states today find themselves in an international system in which the traditional centres of power are shifting. No longer is power solely concentrated among a select few powerful states in North America, Europe and Japan; rather, economic, political, and military power are now more widely dispersed around the world. The economic and financial weakening of the West, coupled with the rise of China, India, Brazil and a resurgent Russia, have dramatically changed the power dynamics of the international system and accelerated the pace of change. In sum, the uni-polar world of the post-Cold War era dominated by the United States and its allies is diminishing and an uncertain new world order is emerging.
This rare realignment of the international system presents a historic opportunity for Caribbean states to reinvent themselves in world affairs and to assert themselves on the international stage. Importantly, the Caribbean’s geographic location and colonial history place it within multiple spheres of influence and define the region’s relationship with the rest of the world. The international relations of the region encompasses Caribbean state’s relations with powerful state actors like the United States (US), China, and Russia; former colonial and status quo powers such as Britain, France, Netherlands and Canada; and regional and revolutionary states like Cuba and Venezuela.
Hemispherically, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), an international cooperation agreement for the integration of Latin America and the Caribbean, counts among its ranks Caribbean states including Dominica, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Antigua and Barbuda; as well as Latin American states including Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador. The organization was established to coordinate and strengthen cooperation between the neighboring countries of the Caribbean, Central America, and and South America.
In the Caribbean itself, the region’s premiere regional organization, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), is an exercise by a collection of Caribbean states to carve out an independent sphere of influence. The organisation’s major challenge is managing the region’s international relationships, while maintaining an independent position that promotes the interests of the region.
Notably, the Caribbean has been courted by a number of states as the competition for natural resources and influence between great and emerging powers has intensified in recent years. World powers such as China and Russia have established partnerships and struck a number of strategic deals in select Caribbean countries. Venezuela continues to supply Caribbean states with cheap crude oil, refined petroleum products, and liquefied petroleum gas at reduced rates under its PetroCaribe Energy Cooperation Agreement. In further overtures, Venezuela in late 2008 expressed interest in joining the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), but its application for membership was never formally taken up by the subregional organization. The US is closely monitoring the activities of other world powers and hemispheric players in the region, and recently pledged to renew engagement with CARICOM and to increase aid flows to the region.
Despite these advances, CARICOM must be careful not to entangle itself in any regional, hemispheric, or global disputes or rivalries between competing powers. Rather, Caribbean states should concentrate their foreign policy on international trade, climate change, democracy, and other issues that directly impact the region.
Historically, the Caribbean, with the exception of Cuba, has played a marginal role in world affairs in the post-Cold War era. The relatively weak position of the region in the international system necessitates its small island and coastal developing states’ reliance on international organisations and institutions such as the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organisation (WTO), and Organisation of American States (OAS) to advance their agendas and interests in global affairs. As members of the WTO, Caribbean states have skilfully defended their commercial interests, which was clearly demonstrated by the Republic of Antigua & Barbuda, which successfully mounted a challenge against the United States in 2005 on the issue of online gambling. Caribbean states have also vigorously defended their commercial interests in the stalled Doha round of international trade talks by joining a number of emerging and developing states calling for the elimination of farm subsidies and lowering of non-tariff barriers in agricultural markets in the US, Europe, and Japan.
In the diplomatic arena, Caribbean states have also performed skilfully, which was most recently demonstrated by the twin-island Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, which successfully hosted and superbly chaired the Fifth Summit of the Americas (April 2009) held in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad. The highly anticipated meeting was expected to be highly contentious and non-productive, but was salvaged in part by the statesmanship of Prime Minister Patrick Manning and his aides. Importantly, CARICOM member states are strategically positioned to play a constructive role in the democratic development of the region, given their strong traditions of democracy and respect for human rights. Their solid record in both areas gives them the credibility and legitimacy to speak forcefully on issues of democratisation, political reform, and human rights with respect to Cuba and Haiti.
Another area where the Caribbean as a region has an opportunity to make its voice heard on the international stage is climate change. The danger of rising sea levels and more intense and frequent tropical storms and hurricanes in the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea as a result of global warming makes climate change a legitimate concern for island states and coastal nations. Caribbean states should use international forums, such as that provided at the United Nation's Summit on Climate Change in Copenhagen (December 2009), to express their concerns and inform the world about the real dangers of climate change and its impact on the region. Caribbean states must also leverage their membership in international institutions like the UN and OAS to garner support for combating problems like drug and human trafficking.
Finally, in order to play a greater role in global affairs, Caribbean states must transform the region’s image from that of sunny vacation destinations and offshore tax havens to regional power brokers. The Dominican Republic was moderately successful in this regard when it helped mediate and resolve a conflict among Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador in 2008. Notably, the country has reapplied for membership in CARICOM.
In conclusion, the realignment of the international system has created a historic opening for the Caribbean. Caribbean states, and in particular CARICOM member states, have an opportunity to change the Caribbean’s marginal role in world affairs by strategically asserting themselves on the international stage. A constructive role can be played by Caribbean states in hemispheric relations and the democratisation of Cuba and stabilisation of Haiti. Caribbean states can also take active roles in world trade talks facilitated by the WTO and global talks on climate change. If Caribbean states act strategically to position themselves as power brokers in the emerging new world order, they have an opportunity to exert a greater measure of influence in the international system than has traditionally been the case, despite their limited capabilities as developing small island and coastal states.
Benito Wheatley is an Analyst at the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in Washington, DC and a Researcher for the publication ‘International Affairs Forum,’ produced by the Centre for International Affairs in Arlington, Virginia. For comments or questions he may be contacted at bwheatley@ia-forum.org
Caribbean states today find themselves in an international system in which the traditional centres of power are shifting. No longer is power solely concentrated among a select few powerful states in North America, Europe and Japan; rather, economic, political, and military power are now more widely dispersed around the world. The economic and financial weakening of the West, coupled with the rise of China, India, Brazil and a resurgent Russia, have dramatically changed the power dynamics of the international system and accelerated the pace of change. In sum, the uni-polar world of the post-Cold War era dominated by the United States and its allies is diminishing and an uncertain new world order is emerging.
This rare realignment of the international system presents a historic opportunity for Caribbean states to reinvent themselves in world affairs and to assert themselves on the international stage. Importantly, the Caribbean’s geographic location and colonial history place it within multiple spheres of influence and define the region’s relationship with the rest of the world. The international relations of the region encompasses Caribbean state’s relations with powerful state actors like the United States (US), China, and Russia; former colonial and status quo powers such as Britain, France, Netherlands and Canada; and regional and revolutionary states like Cuba and Venezuela.
Hemispherically, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), an international cooperation agreement for the integration of Latin America and the Caribbean, counts among its ranks Caribbean states including Dominica, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Antigua and Barbuda; as well as Latin American states including Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador. The organization was established to coordinate and strengthen cooperation between the neighboring countries of the Caribbean, Central America, and and South America.
In the Caribbean itself, the region’s premiere regional organization, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), is an exercise by a collection of Caribbean states to carve out an independent sphere of influence. The organisation’s major challenge is managing the region’s international relationships, while maintaining an independent position that promotes the interests of the region.
Notably, the Caribbean has been courted by a number of states as the competition for natural resources and influence between great and emerging powers has intensified in recent years. World powers such as China and Russia have established partnerships and struck a number of strategic deals in select Caribbean countries. Venezuela continues to supply Caribbean states with cheap crude oil, refined petroleum products, and liquefied petroleum gas at reduced rates under its PetroCaribe Energy Cooperation Agreement. In further overtures, Venezuela in late 2008 expressed interest in joining the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), but its application for membership was never formally taken up by the subregional organization. The US is closely monitoring the activities of other world powers and hemispheric players in the region, and recently pledged to renew engagement with CARICOM and to increase aid flows to the region.
Despite these advances, CARICOM must be careful not to entangle itself in any regional, hemispheric, or global disputes or rivalries between competing powers. Rather, Caribbean states should concentrate their foreign policy on international trade, climate change, democracy, and other issues that directly impact the region.
Historically, the Caribbean, with the exception of Cuba, has played a marginal role in world affairs in the post-Cold War era. The relatively weak position of the region in the international system necessitates its small island and coastal developing states’ reliance on international organisations and institutions such as the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organisation (WTO), and Organisation of American States (OAS) to advance their agendas and interests in global affairs. As members of the WTO, Caribbean states have skilfully defended their commercial interests, which was clearly demonstrated by the Republic of Antigua & Barbuda, which successfully mounted a challenge against the United States in 2005 on the issue of online gambling. Caribbean states have also vigorously defended their commercial interests in the stalled Doha round of international trade talks by joining a number of emerging and developing states calling for the elimination of farm subsidies and lowering of non-tariff barriers in agricultural markets in the US, Europe, and Japan.
In the diplomatic arena, Caribbean states have also performed skilfully, which was most recently demonstrated by the twin-island Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, which successfully hosted and superbly chaired the Fifth Summit of the Americas (April 2009) held in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad. The highly anticipated meeting was expected to be highly contentious and non-productive, but was salvaged in part by the statesmanship of Prime Minister Patrick Manning and his aides. Importantly, CARICOM member states are strategically positioned to play a constructive role in the democratic development of the region, given their strong traditions of democracy and respect for human rights. Their solid record in both areas gives them the credibility and legitimacy to speak forcefully on issues of democratisation, political reform, and human rights with respect to Cuba and Haiti.
Another area where the Caribbean as a region has an opportunity to make its voice heard on the international stage is climate change. The danger of rising sea levels and more intense and frequent tropical storms and hurricanes in the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea as a result of global warming makes climate change a legitimate concern for island states and coastal nations. Caribbean states should use international forums, such as that provided at the United Nation's Summit on Climate Change in Copenhagen (December 2009), to express their concerns and inform the world about the real dangers of climate change and its impact on the region. Caribbean states must also leverage their membership in international institutions like the UN and OAS to garner support for combating problems like drug and human trafficking.
Finally, in order to play a greater role in global affairs, Caribbean states must transform the region’s image from that of sunny vacation destinations and offshore tax havens to regional power brokers. The Dominican Republic was moderately successful in this regard when it helped mediate and resolve a conflict among Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador in 2008. Notably, the country has reapplied for membership in CARICOM.
In conclusion, the realignment of the international system has created a historic opening for the Caribbean. Caribbean states, and in particular CARICOM member states, have an opportunity to change the Caribbean’s marginal role in world affairs by strategically asserting themselves on the international stage. A constructive role can be played by Caribbean states in hemispheric relations and the democratisation of Cuba and stabilisation of Haiti. Caribbean states can also take active roles in world trade talks facilitated by the WTO and global talks on climate change. If Caribbean states act strategically to position themselves as power brokers in the emerging new world order, they have an opportunity to exert a greater measure of influence in the international system than has traditionally been the case, despite their limited capabilities as developing small island and coastal states.
05 February 2010
Beloved Papuan Activist Joins the Ancestors
Human Rights activist-dies-at-age-61
By Cindy Trinh
Impunity Watch Reporter
Oceania MANOKWARI, West Papua
Papuan human rights activist, Viktor Kaisiepo, passed away in his home town of Amersfoort, in the Netherlands, at the age of 61.
Kaisiepo was a spokesperson for the West Papua People's Front, which is a federation of Papuan organizations in the Netherlands. Kaisiepo was born in Dutch New Guinea. His family left for the Netherlands when Dutch New Guinea was handed over to Indonesia in 1962. Kaisiepo's father was a well-known activist for Papuan independence. Viktor Kaisiepo followed his father's footsteps, and also became one of the most well regarded activists for Papuan independence.
Kaisiepo frequently lobbied the United Nations to promote the rights of his people as well as the rights of other indigenous peoples. He devoted his life to the right to self-determination of the Indonesian province of Papua. Kaisiepo became a familiar face to the indigenous activists throughout theworld, representing the indigenous peoples of Papua at various international conferences. He was the Executive Director of the Foundation Papua Lobby, and a member of Presidium Dewan Papua and represented the organization in Europe, the United States, and at the United Nations.
Since 2003, he served as a consultant to the Word Bank Grants Facility for Indigenous Peoples. He also co-founded and held positions in various NGOs, including: the Unrepresented Nations and People's Organization (UNPO), an international organizations with 110 millions members whose aim is to achieve recognition and improvement for peoples through peaceful means; the InternationalAlliance of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in the Tropical Forests; the secretariat of Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP); and served as a Human Rights Defender in 1985 for the United Nations.
Kaisiepo will be remembered as one of the most influential human rights activists.
***************************************************************************
Statement of Unrepresented Peoples' Organisation (UNPO)
on the passing of Victor Kaisiepo
On hearing of the demise of Mr. Victor Kaisiepo, the UNPO responded with great sadness. Mr. Kaisiepo was one of the founding members of the UNPO in 1991 at the Peace Palace in The Hague, the Netherlands and acted as the Assistant General Secretary for the Environment in the early 1990’s. Afterwards, he remained a highly regarded member of the UNPO Steering Committee for many years as well as a compassionate speaker at various UNPO events.
Hereby the UNPO offers its sincere condolences to the family of Mr. Kaisiepo and wants to assure them of the highest respect for him and his work.
While born in West Papua, his family left for the Netherlands when the territory was handed over to Indonesia in 1962, and Mr. Kaisiepo lived in Amersfoort, the Netherlands, until his death.
Victor Kaisiepo’s passing has left the West Papuan community in the Netherlands and in West Papua in mourning, as he was a renowned Papuan activist and spokesperson. He also functioned as European Representative of the Papuan Council of the Papuan Presidium (PDP) as well as International Representative of the Dewan Adat Papua (DAP), the Indigenous Papua Council. He partook in the international Papua Lobby, seeking to generate support for genuine dialogue between the Papuans and the government in Jakarta. Moreover, Mr Kaisiepo has lobbied at the United Nations to promote the rights of his people as well as the rights of other indigenous peoples.
Mr. Busdachin, current UNPO General Secretary, on behalf of all 54 members of UNPO pays his respects to this remarkable spokesperson and activist within the West Papuan community, as being one of the founding fathers of UNPO.
By Cindy Trinh
Impunity Watch Reporter
Oceania MANOKWARI, West Papua
Papuan human rights activist, Viktor Kaisiepo, passed away in his home town of Amersfoort, in the Netherlands, at the age of 61.
Kaisiepo was a spokesperson for the West Papua People's Front, which is a federation of Papuan organizations in the Netherlands. Kaisiepo was born in Dutch New Guinea. His family left for the Netherlands when Dutch New Guinea was handed over to Indonesia in 1962. Kaisiepo's father was a well-known activist for Papuan independence. Viktor Kaisiepo followed his father's footsteps, and also became one of the most well regarded activists for Papuan independence.
Kaisiepo frequently lobbied the United Nations to promote the rights of his people as well as the rights of other indigenous peoples. He devoted his life to the right to self-determination of the Indonesian province of Papua. Kaisiepo became a familiar face to the indigenous activists throughout theworld, representing the indigenous peoples of Papua at various international conferences. He was the Executive Director of the Foundation Papua Lobby, and a member of Presidium Dewan Papua and represented the organization in Europe, the United States, and at the United Nations.
Since 2003, he served as a consultant to the Word Bank Grants Facility for Indigenous Peoples. He also co-founded and held positions in various NGOs, including: the Unrepresented Nations and People's Organization (UNPO), an international organizations with 110 millions members whose aim is to achieve recognition and improvement for peoples through peaceful means; the InternationalAlliance of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in the Tropical Forests; the secretariat of Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP); and served as a Human Rights Defender in 1985 for the United Nations.
Kaisiepo will be remembered as one of the most influential human rights activists.
***************************************************************************
Statement of Unrepresented Peoples' Organisation (UNPO)
on the passing of Victor Kaisiepo
On hearing of the demise of Mr. Victor Kaisiepo, the UNPO responded with great sadness. Mr. Kaisiepo was one of the founding members of the UNPO in 1991 at the Peace Palace in The Hague, the Netherlands and acted as the Assistant General Secretary for the Environment in the early 1990’s. Afterwards, he remained a highly regarded member of the UNPO Steering Committee for many years as well as a compassionate speaker at various UNPO events.
Hereby the UNPO offers its sincere condolences to the family of Mr. Kaisiepo and wants to assure them of the highest respect for him and his work.
While born in West Papua, his family left for the Netherlands when the territory was handed over to Indonesia in 1962, and Mr. Kaisiepo lived in Amersfoort, the Netherlands, until his death.
Victor Kaisiepo’s passing has left the West Papuan community in the Netherlands and in West Papua in mourning, as he was a renowned Papuan activist and spokesperson. He also functioned as European Representative of the Papuan Council of the Papuan Presidium (PDP) as well as International Representative of the Dewan Adat Papua (DAP), the Indigenous Papua Council. He partook in the international Papua Lobby, seeking to generate support for genuine dialogue between the Papuans and the government in Jakarta. Moreover, Mr Kaisiepo has lobbied at the United Nations to promote the rights of his people as well as the rights of other indigenous peoples.
Mr. Busdachin, current UNPO General Secretary, on behalf of all 54 members of UNPO pays his respects to this remarkable spokesperson and activist within the West Papuan community, as being one of the founding fathers of UNPO.
03 February 2010
HAWAI'I FILM RECEIVES SPECIAL JURY PRIZE AT TAHITI FILM FESTIVAL
Media Contact:
Ana Currie, Pasifika Foundation Hawai'i
e-mail: acurrie@hawaii.rr.com
PAPEETE, TAHITI - Hawaiian filmmaker Anne Keala Kelly's newly released documentary "Noho Hewa: The Wrongful Occupation of Hawai'i" was awarded a special jury prize at this week's Festival International Du Film Documentaire Oceanien (FIFO) in Tahiti.
The packed Grand Theatre at Papeete's Maison de la Culture exploded into loud cheers, hoots and applause when the special jury prize for Noho Hewa: The Wrongful Occupation of Hawai'i was announced last night at the closing event of the Festival International Du Film Documentaire Oceanien (FIFO) in Tahiti.
Jurors were moved by its raw and passionate portrayal of the struggles of today's native Hawaiians.
Noho Hewa had attracted considerable attention among the professional and community viewers for its edgy and explicit expression of the ongoing effects of colonialism in Hawai'i. For many Tahitian and other visiting Pacific island viewers, Kelly's film enabled them to understand, for the first time, the realities faced by the Hawaiian people in their own homeland, and the kanaka Maoli (native Hawaiian) resistance to the desecration and obliteration of their culture by the US military, real estate development, and tourism pressures.
In the Hawaiian language, hewa means "wrong" and noho means "to occupy." From the military exercises and bombings at Makua and Pohakuloa and the desecration of burial sites at Hokulia and Wal-mart, to Maoli homelessness - in stark contrast to the widespread construction of upscale gated communities - and the resistance to the Akaka bill, Kelly's film weaves a context of understanding of how the U.S. overthrow and continuing occupation of the sovereign Kingdom of Hawai'i affect every aspect of native Hawaiian life. The film makes a case that through the force of U.S. laws, economy, militarism, and real estate speculation, the Hawaiian people are facing systematic, intentional obliteration.
The film features interviews with Hawaiian activists and academics, whose comments serve to further clarify the significance and direness of the ongoing erosion of Hawaiian culture. That's a message that resonates deeply with the people of the islands of Pasifika, most of whom continue to struggle with many of the same issues.
Noho Hewa was more than six years in production, and in 2008 won the Hawaii International Film Festival's Award For Best Documentary. Kelly is a Hawaiian journalist and filmmaker who has reported on politics, culture, the environment and indigenous peoples. Keala's reports air regularly on the Pacifica Network's Free Speech Radio News and her print journalism has appeared in The Nation, Indian Country Today, Honolulu Weekly, Hawai'i Island Journal and other publications. Her news footage has been featured on The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer and Democracy Now! and in September 2008 Keala co-produced "The Other Hawaii" for Al Jazeera. She has an MFA in Directing from UCLA.
The Grand Prize winning film at FIFO was Te Henua E Noho, a moving film about the effects of climate change on a small island community. Te Henua E Noho was directed by New Zealander Briar March and produced by On The Level Productions.
The winner of the Prix Selection du Public - the popular choice of screening audiences - was Terre Natale: Retour a Rurutu, directed by Jean-Michele Corillon and produced by Kwanza & Bleu Lagon Production & Canal Overseas. A visually stunning and emotionally rich presentation, this documentary tells the story of two young adults, a brother and sister, who were born on the island of Rurutu in the Austral archipelago of French Polynesia and adopted as very small children by a French couple. After growing up in France, they return to Rurutu to re-connect with their culture and re-discover their roots.
Three special jury awards were given; along with Noho Hewa, the Austalian film Bastardy and the New Zealand documentary The Topp Twins: Untouchable Girls were also given special tribute by the jury for their unique and compelling character.
FIFO is one of Pasifika's major film events, a gathering of filmmakers, TV producers, and multimedia journalists from throughout the region to meet, network, and develop projects together. The 2010 festival screenings attracted more than 20,000 viewers in four screening venues at the cultural center.
Festival officials describe the event as a "meeting place for lovers of the Pacific, our vast region, which boasts such a varied and thriving cultural heritage, synonymous with dreaming, mystery and exploration . . . an enriching, sometimes astonishing, often surprising experience ranging over characters, identities, history and current affairs."
Hawai'i was represented at the festival by Kelly's film, as well as by Olohega, a documentary produced by a partnership of Pasifika Foundation Hawai'i (PFH) and TV New Zealand/Tagata Pasifika. Olohega was selected by the festival committee as one of the 25 films screened for general festival audiences in addition to the 17 films that were entered in the juried competition. Both Noho Hewa and Olohega were also among the seven films chosen for special question-and-answer sessions, an indication of the intense interest generated by these Hawai'i-based films. Pasifika Foundation Hawai'i executive director Ana Currie was on hand to answer questions about Olohega, which chronicles the poignant and heartbreaking story of Tokelau's fourth island, Olohega, which was claimed by an American whaling captain, Eli Jennings, in 1856. In 1925, Jennings' descendants utilized their American connections to successfully annex Olohega, known then as "Swains Island," to the United States, and continue to maintain their ownership of the island today.
The film tells the stories of the Tokelauan people of Olohega who were forcibly evicted from their island home in the 1950s. In their own words, the elders who now live in a tight-knit community on Oahu in Hawai'i, describe their shock, sadness and shame at their eviction, as well as their longing to return to their beautiful and fertile island. Only a handful of people now live on Olohega, an island that once, as communal farming land, supported many Tokelauan communities with its bounty of crops.
After announcing the special jury award for Noho Hewa, jury member Elise Huffer explained that every member of the jury had been deeply affected by Kelly's film. "This film is militant and uncompromising," she stated, and said that the jury was unanimous in choosing to award a special prize for this film that told such an important story in such a powerful way.
"I'm shocked and deeply honored," said Kelly in a post-award interview. "And for me the most important thing is that the message of the film was so strongly embraced by the jury, and by the audiences here. This is a story that needs to be told, and to be able to share it with other people of the Pacific is very meaningful to me."
Ana Currie, Pasifika Foundation Hawai'i
e-mail: acurrie@hawaii.rr.com
PAPEETE, TAHITI - Hawaiian filmmaker Anne Keala Kelly's newly released documentary "Noho Hewa: The Wrongful Occupation of Hawai'i" was awarded a special jury prize at this week's Festival International Du Film Documentaire Oceanien (FIFO) in Tahiti.
The packed Grand Theatre at Papeete's Maison de la Culture exploded into loud cheers, hoots and applause when the special jury prize for Noho Hewa: The Wrongful Occupation of Hawai'i was announced last night at the closing event of the Festival International Du Film Documentaire Oceanien (FIFO) in Tahiti.
Jurors were moved by its raw and passionate portrayal of the struggles of today's native Hawaiians.
Noho Hewa had attracted considerable attention among the professional and community viewers for its edgy and explicit expression of the ongoing effects of colonialism in Hawai'i. For many Tahitian and other visiting Pacific island viewers, Kelly's film enabled them to understand, for the first time, the realities faced by the Hawaiian people in their own homeland, and the kanaka Maoli (native Hawaiian) resistance to the desecration and obliteration of their culture by the US military, real estate development, and tourism pressures.
In the Hawaiian language, hewa means "wrong" and noho means "to occupy." From the military exercises and bombings at Makua and Pohakuloa and the desecration of burial sites at Hokulia and Wal-mart, to Maoli homelessness - in stark contrast to the widespread construction of upscale gated communities - and the resistance to the Akaka bill, Kelly's film weaves a context of understanding of how the U.S. overthrow and continuing occupation of the sovereign Kingdom of Hawai'i affect every aspect of native Hawaiian life. The film makes a case that through the force of U.S. laws, economy, militarism, and real estate speculation, the Hawaiian people are facing systematic, intentional obliteration.
The film features interviews with Hawaiian activists and academics, whose comments serve to further clarify the significance and direness of the ongoing erosion of Hawaiian culture. That's a message that resonates deeply with the people of the islands of Pasifika, most of whom continue to struggle with many of the same issues.
Noho Hewa was more than six years in production, and in 2008 won the Hawaii International Film Festival's Award For Best Documentary. Kelly is a Hawaiian journalist and filmmaker who has reported on politics, culture, the environment and indigenous peoples. Keala's reports air regularly on the Pacifica Network's Free Speech Radio News and her print journalism has appeared in The Nation, Indian Country Today, Honolulu Weekly, Hawai'i Island Journal and other publications. Her news footage has been featured on The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer and Democracy Now! and in September 2008 Keala co-produced "The Other Hawaii" for Al Jazeera. She has an MFA in Directing from UCLA.
The Grand Prize winning film at FIFO was Te Henua E Noho, a moving film about the effects of climate change on a small island community. Te Henua E Noho was directed by New Zealander Briar March and produced by On The Level Productions.
The winner of the Prix Selection du Public - the popular choice of screening audiences - was Terre Natale: Retour a Rurutu, directed by Jean-Michele Corillon and produced by Kwanza & Bleu Lagon Production & Canal Overseas. A visually stunning and emotionally rich presentation, this documentary tells the story of two young adults, a brother and sister, who were born on the island of Rurutu in the Austral archipelago of French Polynesia and adopted as very small children by a French couple. After growing up in France, they return to Rurutu to re-connect with their culture and re-discover their roots.
Three special jury awards were given; along with Noho Hewa, the Austalian film Bastardy and the New Zealand documentary The Topp Twins: Untouchable Girls were also given special tribute by the jury for their unique and compelling character.
FIFO is one of Pasifika's major film events, a gathering of filmmakers, TV producers, and multimedia journalists from throughout the region to meet, network, and develop projects together. The 2010 festival screenings attracted more than 20,000 viewers in four screening venues at the cultural center.
Festival officials describe the event as a "meeting place for lovers of the Pacific, our vast region, which boasts such a varied and thriving cultural heritage, synonymous with dreaming, mystery and exploration . . . an enriching, sometimes astonishing, often surprising experience ranging over characters, identities, history and current affairs."
Hawai'i was represented at the festival by Kelly's film, as well as by Olohega, a documentary produced by a partnership of Pasifika Foundation Hawai'i (PFH) and TV New Zealand/Tagata Pasifika. Olohega was selected by the festival committee as one of the 25 films screened for general festival audiences in addition to the 17 films that were entered in the juried competition. Both Noho Hewa and Olohega were also among the seven films chosen for special question-and-answer sessions, an indication of the intense interest generated by these Hawai'i-based films. Pasifika Foundation Hawai'i executive director Ana Currie was on hand to answer questions about Olohega, which chronicles the poignant and heartbreaking story of Tokelau's fourth island, Olohega, which was claimed by an American whaling captain, Eli Jennings, in 1856. In 1925, Jennings' descendants utilized their American connections to successfully annex Olohega, known then as "Swains Island," to the United States, and continue to maintain their ownership of the island today.
The film tells the stories of the Tokelauan people of Olohega who were forcibly evicted from their island home in the 1950s. In their own words, the elders who now live in a tight-knit community on Oahu in Hawai'i, describe their shock, sadness and shame at their eviction, as well as their longing to return to their beautiful and fertile island. Only a handful of people now live on Olohega, an island that once, as communal farming land, supported many Tokelauan communities with its bounty of crops.
After announcing the special jury award for Noho Hewa, jury member Elise Huffer explained that every member of the jury had been deeply affected by Kelly's film. "This film is militant and uncompromising," she stated, and said that the jury was unanimous in choosing to award a special prize for this film that told such an important story in such a powerful way.
"I'm shocked and deeply honored," said Kelly in a post-award interview. "And for me the most important thing is that the message of the film was so strongly embraced by the jury, and by the audiences here. This is a story that needs to be told, and to be able to share it with other people of the Pacific is very meaningful to me."
31 January 2010
Constitutional Reform and Political Identity in the Non-Independent Caribbean
An earlier version of this paper was published in “Caribbean Perspectives, scholarly journal of the Eastern Caribbean Centre of the University of the Virgin Islands, January 2009.
by Dr. Carlyle G. Corbin
International Advisor on Governance
I. The Historical Context
From the middle to the late 19th century, the Caribbean was governed by a host of European colonial powers which exerted virtual total influence on the evolution of the political status and identity of small islands in the region. The Caribbean possessions were divided, either as prizes won from the spoils of war, or as territorial acquisitions for strategic considerations, irrespective of the views the inhabitants of the islands. The extraordinary political division of the island of Sint Maarten/St. Martin, along with its proximity to the island of Anguilla proved particularly fatuous given the resulting emergence of three non-independent jurisdictions under three separate European states with largely incompatible administrative structures, conducting commerce in three separate currencies and communicating in three different official languages - with a combined population of under 100,000 persons. (1) The division of the Virgin Islands into separate British and U.S. possessions is another example of artificial political constructs in a region where the diversity in political identity is unparralled within such a small geographic space.
Emerging from this process were island enclaves controlled by a variety of European states. The British, the Dutch, the French, the Spanish, the Danish, and later the Americans, bought and sold islands based on economic and other strategic considerations, with little regard for the majority of the people who were overwhelmingly of African descent. This practice produced a proliferation of externally-controlled island dependencies by the end of the 19th century, and the colonial governance arrangements became increasingly sophisticated throughout the 20th Century and into the 21st.
After the 1960 adoption by the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly of the landmark Decolonisation Declaration (2), and its companion resolution defining full self-government (3), many of the dependencies of the region achieved a full measure of self-government through political independence, or via free association or integration with another country. Decolonisation effectively stalled at the beginning of the 1990’s owing to diminished attention paid to the process in the international euphoria following the end of the Cold War (4). Almost two decades into the 21st Century, six territories administered by the UK and one by the US are formally listed by the U.N. as non self-governing (5). The one U.S. commonwealth and two Dutch associated countries are arguably more autonomous governance models, and were formally removed from UN oversight by General Assembly resolution. The three overseas departments of France are self-governing through political integration and the exercise of full political rights within the French Republic.
II. Governance in the Non-Independent Caribbean
For the dependencies under U.K. administration - in particular, the Turks and Caicos Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, British Virgin Islands, Anguilla and to a lesser extent Bermuda, there is a “direct role by the cosmopole in the daily governing process via the reserved and other constitutional powers set aside for the U.K.-appointed governor in such areas as external affairs, internal security, and the civil service. The governor’s powers to annul, and to decline to assent to legislation adopted by the elected legislative body of the territory, is also noted. The additional authority of the governor to impose legislation unilaterally on the territory without the consent and often against the will of the elected government (6) has been termed in the U.K. House of Commons as the “nuclear option.” Collectively, these constitutionally-granted powers to an un-elected official from the cosmopole is illustrative of a continued democratic deficit in the U.K.-administered territories.
A more indirect approach characterises the U.S. governance of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Since the advent of the elected governorship in both territories replacing the appointed governor, direct executive power from Washington became less evident, save for U.S. jurisdiction over land and marine resources, administrative control of the territorial borders and increasing hands-on management in other areas. From a legislative perspective, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands which are appurtenant to, but not part of the U.S., are governed by the territorial clause of the U.S. Constitution which gives the U.S. Congress plenary authority to unilaterally apply U.S. laws (7). Both territories have active non-voting delegates to the U.S. House of Representatives, with no provision for representation in the U.S. Senate, and no vote in U.S. presidential elections. This compares with the absence of representation of any kind in the U.K. House of Commons for the U.K.–administered territories in the Caribbean.
On the other hand, the self-governing countries of Aruba and the five-island grouping of the Netherlands Antilles, in association with the Kingdom of the Netherlands, combine relative autonomous powers with aspects of political integration, e.g. shared citizenship (8). This is similar to the constitutional arrangement between Greenland and the Faroe Islands vis a vis the Kingdom of Denmark. Both Dutch and Danish dependency models are characterised by voting representation in the parliaments of the Netherlands and Denmark, respectively, coupled with the exercise of effective autonomy. As noted, the French overseas departments of Guadeloupe (and its dependencies), Martinique, and French Guiana enjoy full political integration synonymous with the integrated island state of Hawaii.
III. Distinctions and Perceptions of Political Identity
Political identity in the non-independent Caribbean is greatly influenced by the distinctions between dependence and associated governance. For the dependent territories, such rights are governed by several considerations. The extent to which the elected government can legislate cultural and political identity is a primary factor, and is determined by the degree of autonomy of the prevailing constitutional arrangement. Clearly, the U.K. territories have more constitutional flexibility in this area, as they were never regarded as “part of the U.K.”
In this context, significant variation exists between the U.K. and U.S. dependency models, which contrasts with the exercise of autonomous power in the Caribbean jurisdictions associated with the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Regarding the U.K. dependency model, Bourne asserts that:
“There was never confusion concerning the differing status of those British citizens who settled in the colonies and their descendants on one hand, and the people of the territory on the other (9). ”
These distinctions were understood even after the adoption in 2002 of the British Overseas Territories Act, amending the British Nationality Act of 1981, which changed the nomenclature from British dependent territories citizenship to overseas territories citizenship, while simultaneously conferring British citizenship on the people of the UK-administered territories (10). The limits on the rights granted with the conferred citizenship were made abundantly clear by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in 2001 during the second reading of the legislation in the House of Commons, in which he stated:
“The(British Overseas Territories) Bill is about nationality. British citizenship (to be extended) carries with it the right of abode in the United Kingdom and the right of free movement in Europe, but (does not offer) other rights and obligations, including the right to preferential rates for tertiary education, health and social security benefits and the vote in UK parliamentary elections…” (11)
Dependency governance in the U.S. territories, on the other hand, reflects concepts of territorial “ownership.” (12) Both models are contrasted with the freely-associated political status models of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruban which acknowledge a distinct political and cultural identity of the islands different than that of the Dutch Kingdom.
Another consideration with respect to the dependent territories is very much a matter of self-perception in relation to the interplay between cultural/national identity and citizenship, coupled with the diversity of national origin of the population. In the British territories, the perception of cultural and political identity is understood in an island-specific, ‘nationalist’ context, e.g. a person is ‘Bermudian’ or ‘Anguillan,’ as opposed to being ‘British.’ This is well-defined in the respective constitutions and territorial laws discussed later. This contrasts with the U.S. Virgin Islands where public expressions often mistakenly equate identity with U.S. citizenship. Increasingly, ‘Virgin Islanders’ are defined as ‘African-Americans,’ perhaps initially for ease of reference in federal funding categories, but later acquiring a broader usage. However, the mere combination of cultural descent with citizenship in this manner is mis-guided, since the category is intended for a different set of African-descendent people who went through a specific historical and cultural experience in the continental U.S.
Perspectives on cultural and political identity in the dependent territories are also influenced by demographics. In the U.K. dependencies, there are significant numbers of Caribbean nationals who exercise fundamental rights, but maintain political rights only through their country of origin, except in the cases where long-term residency has led to naturalization. Further, the work permit programmes governing the residency of the non-naturalised Caribbean nationals in the U.K. territories is often governed by territorial ‘turnover laws’ requiring the person to return to their country of origin after a defined period, with varying degrees of privilege to return. Degrees of social dislocation can result from this practice, particularly as related to school-age students who may have been born in the dependent territory but enjoy only the full citizenship of their parents. This contrasts with the immediate grant of U.S. citizenship under U.S. law for children born in the U.S. territories and who can also claim the citizenship of their parents.
For the U.S. territories, Puerto Rico with a population exceeding 4 million has had little need historically for additional labour, notwithstanding the large Dominican Republic community which is integral to economic sustainability. For the U.S. Virgin Islands, the need for additional labour to build and service a fast-growing tourism industry in the wake of the U.S. travel embargo on Cuba resulted in significant population growth through immigration from the wider region. Leibowitz indicated that the numbers reached 34,000 between 1960 - 1970, exceeding the entire 1960 population of the territory. (13) The temporary worker system which had been legislated by the U.S. Congress pursuant to U.S. immigration laws facilitated the movement of mainly African descendents from other parts of the Caribbean to the U.S. Virgin Islands to meet growing labour needs. Concerned with the projected financial impact of the extension of public services to the new residents, the U.S. Virgin Islands legislature sought to use its local authority to regulate access to education, housing and other areas. This was later overturned by the U.S. courts and applicability of U.S. equal protection laws. A specific U.S. immigration measure enacted in 1981 also provided for a process of achieving permanent residency status in the territory, and ultimately U.S. citizenship.
This comparison in the migration of people to the U.K. and U.S. territories does not suggest favour of one system over the other, since many people experienced significant violation of their worker’s rights under both systems in relation to externally-owned development projects and establishments. The main objective here is to portray how the development of the two respective dependency models went on to impact the advancement of political and cultural identity. Accordingly, in both the U.K. and U.S. dependencies, a diverse population evolved which included migration from the wider region.
In this regard, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in its 1988 Factbook defined the population of the territory as “74 per cent West Indian (including) 45 per cent born in the (U.S.) Virgin Islands and 29 per cent born elsewhere in the West Indies.” This assessment, perhaps inadvertently, served to confirm the existence of a collective cultural Caribbean identity among the predominately African descendents in the territory. It has been hypothesized that the migrants from the wider Caribbean who came to the U.S. Virgin Islands in the 1960’s might have been the descendents of those Africans who escaped slavery in the Danish West Indies for freedom in the British controlled Caribbean in the preceding century. A genealogical study is not attempted here. The main point is that a unified Caribbean dynamic was a potential basis of a modern paradigm of cultural - and by extension - political identity in the U.S. Virgin Islands, encompassing the prevailing demographic reality. However, the logical extension of such a force might have been a process of natural political evolution that would have been inconsistent with the legitimisation, and subsequent modernisation of dependency governance.
Within this framework, four constitutional conventions in the U.S. Virgin Islands were held between 1964 and 1980. Quite apart from the mandate to create/re-create structures of government through a local constitution to replace the U.S. Revised Organic Act of 1954 was the task of defining/re-defining a political and cultural identity amid changing demographics. The territory’s political status commission of the 1990s had also struggled with similar issues which contributed to a lack of conclusive result in the 1993 status referendum. The Fifth Constitutional Convention, to its significant credit, was undergoing serious analysis of these issues at the end of 2008 into 2009 despite the confines of the existing dependency relationship, even as the exercise was not designed to tackle the fundamental question of political status.
IV. Political and Cultural Identity in Dependency Constitutions
The prevailing constitutions of the U.K. territories in the Caribbean have always acknowledged a separate political identity of the people of the territory vis a vis that of the metropole. This was an important feature of the most recent constitutional review processes underway or completed in five of the six territories (excluding Bermuda) pursuant to the 1999 U.K. Government’s White Paper on Partnership for Progress and Prosperity. In this connection, the British Virgin Islands Constitutional Commissioners in their 2005 recommendations on ‘modernising’ the territory’s constitution addressed a number of relevant issues including the fine-tuning of the “belonger status” and the “preservation of numerical pre-dominance, heritage and culture of indigenous people,” (14) reflective of an ‘island specific nationalist’ focus cited earlier. The Virgin Islands Constitutional Order 2007 ultimately issued by the U.K. reflected much of this thinking.
Accordingly, the first paragraph of the preamble of the new constitution recognised that “… the people of the territory of the (British) Virgin Islands have over centuries evolved with a distinct cultural identity which is the essence of a Virgin Islander.” The preamble also “recall(ed) that because of historical, economic and other reasons many of the people of the Virgin Islands reside elsewhere but have and continue to have an ancestral connection and bond with those Islands.” The new constitution which entered into force in 2007 detailed the criteria for a person who “belongs” to the British Virgin Islands, primarily based on birth or descent, and extends the right to hold elective office in the House of Assembly to this population. (15) A later provision of the preamble “affirm(ed) that the people of the (British) Virgin Islands have generally expressed their desire…to exercise the highest degree of control over the affairs of their country…” This self-recognition of the territory as a country distinct from the U.K. confirms the recognition by the people of a separate political uniqueness, that is, the distinction between their collective political identity and whatever citizenship may be conferred upon them (or subsequently removed) by external legislation. Such recognition of identity is reflected in most constitutions of U.K. territories in the Caribbean, and differs from prevailing views in the U.S. Virgin Islands. On this point, Bourne observed in 2005 that:
“at present, the people of most non self-governing territories other than the U.S. Virgin Islands see their identity as separate from that of their administering power… (while) what we hear in the U.S. Virgin Islands are efforts to accomplish a change to political integration, such as obtaining the presidential vote, being treated as a state with respect to benefit programs, etc., without having a clear analysis of what our present status entitles us to and the overall effect of such political changes.” (16)
In the case of Puerto Rico, a strong political and cultural identity is protected by the insulating predominance of the Spanish language, coupled with a population size far exceeding any other island dependency and large reinforcing diaspora. The complexities of the Puerto Rican ethos significantly influence the territory’s political discourse, while maintaining the unifying thread of cultural identity. This is largely shared by the Puerto Rican people irrespective of their views on a permanent political status achievable through U.S. statehood, free association or integration (17); or on maintaining the accommodation with what Boden describes as “voluntary colonialism with the promise of a completely new form of metropolitan/colony relationship.” (18)
With the control of the executive and legislative branches of the Puerto Rico Government shifting to the pro-integrationist New Progressive Party in January 2009, exertions of distinct political identity typical of the pro-autonomous Popular Democratic Party through active international organisation representation among other manifestations could be reversed if previous changes of power from the autonomous to the integrationist parties are any indication. Regardless of the change in political status preference with the incoming ruling party, however, provisions of the Puerto Rico Constitution maintain important manifestations of identity, in particular the primacy of the Spanish language and the recognition of a Puerto Rican citizenship as a requirement for serving in the Legislative Assembly. (19) Neither can be “wiped away so easily.”
In the Turks and Caicos, the new 2006 constitution confirms belonger status as a manifestation of cultural identity, and as a fundamental criteria for election to the House of Assembly (20), and voter eligibility, without providing further elaboration on the definition as is the case in the 2007 constitution of the British Virgin Islands (21) and in the 1990 amendment to the Anguilla Constitutional Order of 1982 (22). The 2008 Anguillan proposal to the U.K. for full internal self-government is further illustration of a strong collective political identity.
Montserrat and the Cayman Islands continue to proceed in reviewing and recommending changes to their existing constitutions with emphasis on the transfer of varying degrees of power from the un-elected governor to the democratically-elected governments. This reflects the evolution of heightened political maturity in both territories and an “island-centric” approach in the case of the Cayman Islands, as compared to a more regional orientation for Montserrat, whose request to join the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) has been blocked by the U.K.
Both the prevailing 1990 Anguilla constitution and the new 2007 British Virgin Islands constitution reaffirm cultural identity through defining “belonger” status explicit in their document for the purpose of identification, and by extension, as a qualification to hold elective office. Further, the British Virgin Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands sought and obtained additional administrative authority in their new constitutions as a confirmation of a strong political identity separate from the metropole. This is evident in the active participation of all six U.K. territories as associate or full members in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and its myriad of associated bodies, and in the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS).
In the U.K. territories, such engagement in regional affairs is usually sustained even following a change of government since ideological distinctions between political parties are narrow, and the recognition of the importance of regional engagement virtually universal. This contrasts with Puerto Rico where the ideological divide among integrationist, autonomist and independence political forces has formed the very basis of political party allegiances for decades. In the US Virgin Islands, the development of a collective political identity through similar international organisation participation had actually exceeded that of Puerto Rico for significant periods during the last quarter century, but has appears unsustainable, largely based on conflicting U.S. policy which isolates U.S. territories from the same regional institutions in which the U.K. territories enjoy membership. This strategy of isolation based on overly strict constitutional interpretations serves to reinforce dependency governance.
For the Cayman Islands, the 1972 Constitution, amended on five occasions through 2003, recognises a “Caymanian Status” for eligibility to be elected as a member of the Legislative Assembly with ancestral ties to the territory either by birth or through at least one parent (23), and for qualifying as an elector (24). Regarding Montserrat, the House of Assembly in its 2002 Report of the Committee of the Whole approved a number of recommendations of its Constitutional Commissioners which had called for a strengthened political identity. In this connection, the Committee approved, inter alia, the recommendations that regional affairs and international finance be placed within the competence of the elected government, that legislative members should be required to swear an oath to the people of Montserrat, that a free association arrangement should be pursued, and that nativity should be a criteria for citizenship.
Bermuda, unlike the other U.K. territories in the Atlantic/Caribbean which proceeded with post-1999 formal reviews of their individual constitutions, did not participate in the review process as it already has an advanced constitution (short of free association, given the maintenance of the governor’s reserved powers), with any further constitutional advancement recognised as a move to independence (where the governor’s powers would no longer apply). In that connection, the Bermuda Independence Commission was created in 2004 to assess the implications of an independent Bermuda, the ultimate expression of collective political identity. The exhaustive report of the commission made a series of recommendations to advance a public dialogue and engage the business sector on the changes that would be brought about through independence, to clarify post independence citizenship issues, and to review all international opportunities.
As the process of dialogue continues, the existent 1968 constitution (25) as amended most recently in 2003, provides similar expressions cultural identity as contained in other U.K. constitutions, including the recognition of a Bermudian status similar in scope to the belonger status of other U.K. territories. The strong political identity of Bermuda is manifest in the advanced powers the territory exercises, and to which many of the other territories aspire.
V. Political and Cultural Identity in Caribbean Autonomous Countries
As earlier cited, the very nature of the autonomy inherent in a political association arrangement provides for a high degree of political identity, as confirmed by international law and principles (26). This is clear in the 1954 Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as amended, which sets forth the equality of the countries of Holland, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba (27). In this connection, the Charter provides for each of the three countries to “conduct their internal interests autonomously, and their common interests on a basis of equality.” Generally, the Kingdom maintains control over defence, foreign relations and nationality, with the option to exercise financial control through ‘higher supervision’ in the event of extraordinary circumstances necessitating a temporary assumption of financial control by the Kingdom government (28).
The autonomous Antilles model also provides for aspects of political integration as detailed in the Kingdom Charter, with membership in the Dutch Council of Ministers set aside for the Ministers Plenipotentiary of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, respectively (29). Further representation is provided for in the Dutch Council of State in relation to the capacity to influence decisions on the applicability of Kingdom laws and regulations. There are also mechanisms for mutual consent precluding the applicability of certain Kingdom laws, as well as international and financial agreements. On regional and international participation, the Kingdom generally supports the membership of participation of the Netherlands Antilles as a matter of course.
In the context of cultural identity, as in the case of Puerto Rico, linguistic autonomy plays a major part in the expression of cultural identity in specific islands. The indigenous language of Papimentu predominates in Curacao, Bonaire and Aruba, and in 2007 was made one of the official languages in the Netherlands Antilles.
In the wake of the acquisition of separate country status (status aparte) of Aruba in 1986, a series of referenda were held in the remaining five islands on the political future of the Netherlands Antilles, resulting in the initiation of discussions to dismantle the five-island associated country. Both Curacao and Sint Maarten chose ‘separate country’ status, and after intense negotiations - under significant pressure with debt relief hanging in the balance - agreements were made for the two jurisdictions to gain the new status, albeit with significant reduction in autonomy presently held by the five-island grouping before the dismantlement scheduled for October of 2010.
The islands of Bonaire, Saba and St. Eustatius chose what was characterised as ‘direct ties’ with the Dutch Kingdom. That status, however, turned out to be a form of partial integrated overseas provincial status (‘public entities’). As such, the Kingdom Government is set to replace local administrative power, in extenso, with the final parameters still being finalised at the beginning of 2010. Bonaire, on the other hand, had a different understanding of “direct ties,” which did not mean ‘partial integration.’ They have scheduled a new referendum in March, 2010 with the internationally recognised political status option of free association along with the now-revealed ‘public entity’ status on the ballot.
It was reported in the Bonaire media that the United Nations had (curiously) termed as ‘problematic’ the residency period for voter eligibility in the upcoming referendum, arguing that it would exclude some Dutch citizens from participation. The question, of course, is whether this would be a referendum for the people of Bonaire, or for the Dutch citizens in Bonaire. International law confirms the right of people, in an act of self-determination, to determine specific eligibility criteria.
Conclusion
It should be emphasized that issues of identity in the non-independent Caribbean are multidimensional, and fundamentally linked to variables such as the nature of the prevailing political status and its prospects for evolution, the size and national origin of the population and cultural manifestations such as language, heritage and other traditions. These remain considerable factors in the evolution of identity in the countries of the non-independent Caribbean, and can often serve to divert attention from the development of a unified national ethos.
Caribbean regional integration initiatives such as the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME), as well as the Eastern Caribbean - Trinidad and Tobago unity discussions, for example, are important to the reaffirmation/reinforcement of a Caribbean commonality. Should such processes which promote a unified Caribbean identity be embraced or rejected, in full or in part, by the dependencies and associated states which comprise the non-independent Caribbean? Conversely, should they pursue a direction towards reinforcement of the present dependency-cosmopolitan dynamic which would continue to influence an emergence of an alter ego? What are the implications of either approach given the changing global dynamic precipitated by fundamental shifts in the world economy, planetary implications of the failure to achieve a binding treaty on climate change, and the scramble for access to what’s left of the natural resources of the planet by those states which regard their colonial/associated political relationships with non-independent Caribbean countries as a foothold for the extension of exclusive economic zones? Contemporary international relations in the 21st Century must factor in the dynamic of the non-independent Caribbean in all of its manifestations as decisions on constitutional reform will most certainly have an impact on the cultural and political identity of this component of the Caribbean region.
Notes
1) Corbin, Carlyle. 2006. Decolonisation and Self-Government of Curacao. pp.5-6. A paper presented at the University of the Netherlands Antilles by Dr. Carlyle Corbin, Curacao, Netherlands Antilles, 1st June 2006.
2) U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), December 14, 1960.
3) U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), December 15, 1960.
4) Corbin, Carlyle. (1997). A Plan of Action for the Self-Determination of the Remaining Non Self-Governing Territories. A paper delivered to the United Nations Caribbean Regional Seminar, Antigua and Barbuda. pp. 1-3.
5)Report of the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonisation for 2008, Official Records, U.N. General Assembly (A/63/23) 30th June 2008; pp. 1-2.
6) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 62/118. 17 December 2007.
7) United States Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(2).
8) Igarashi, Masahiro. 2002. Associated Statehood in International Law. The Hague, London, New York: Kluwer Law International. pp. 62-65.
9) Bourne, Judith. (2005). The Ambiguity of our U.S. Citizenship. A Paper delivered at a forum of the Virgin Islands Humanities Council, St. John, Virgin Islands. p.3.
10) British Overseas Territories Act. (2002). Section 3.
11) Speech by Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Ben Bradshaw. Second reading of the Overseas Territories Bill. House of Commons. London, 22 November 2001.
12) 7 op. cit.
13) Leibowitz, Arnold H.(1989). Defining Status: a Comprehensive Analysis of United States Territorial Relations. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. pp. 278-284.
14) Report of the Constitutional Commission (2005). Government of the Virgin Islands. Recommendations 16-32.
15) The Virgin Islands Constitutional Order 2007. Section 2(2)( a) – (h) and Section 65 (1) – (4).
16) 9 op. cit. p. 3.
17) Report by the President’s Task Force on Puerto Rico’s Status. (2005). P. 10.
18) Boden, Roy J.A. (2007). The Cayman Islands in Transition. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle. pp. 39-40.
19) Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Article III, Section 5. (1952).
20) The Turks and Caicos Islands Constitutional Order 2006. Section 44(c).
21) 18 op. cit. Section 49 (1)(b)(iii).
22) Anguilla Constitutional (Amendment) Order 1990. Section 25.
23) Cayman Islands (Constitution) Order 1972. Article 18(1) (a), and Article 18 (2) (b).
24) 21 op. cit. Article 25 (b).
25) Bermuda Constitutional Order 1968.
26) 3 op. cit. Annex
27) Documents on International Relations in the Caribbean, University of the West Indies and University of Puerto Rico. (1970)
28) The Netherlands Antilles is comprised of Curacao, Bonaire, Saba, St. Eustatius and Sint Maarten. Aruba attained separate status aparte in 1986 as the third country in the Kingdom, filling the vacancy left by the independence of Suriname.
29) Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (1954 as amended). Article 7.
by Dr. Carlyle G. Corbin
International Advisor on Governance
I. The Historical Context
From the middle to the late 19th century, the Caribbean was governed by a host of European colonial powers which exerted virtual total influence on the evolution of the political status and identity of small islands in the region. The Caribbean possessions were divided, either as prizes won from the spoils of war, or as territorial acquisitions for strategic considerations, irrespective of the views the inhabitants of the islands. The extraordinary political division of the island of Sint Maarten/St. Martin, along with its proximity to the island of Anguilla proved particularly fatuous given the resulting emergence of three non-independent jurisdictions under three separate European states with largely incompatible administrative structures, conducting commerce in three separate currencies and communicating in three different official languages - with a combined population of under 100,000 persons. (1) The division of the Virgin Islands into separate British and U.S. possessions is another example of artificial political constructs in a region where the diversity in political identity is unparralled within such a small geographic space.
Emerging from this process were island enclaves controlled by a variety of European states. The British, the Dutch, the French, the Spanish, the Danish, and later the Americans, bought and sold islands based on economic and other strategic considerations, with little regard for the majority of the people who were overwhelmingly of African descent. This practice produced a proliferation of externally-controlled island dependencies by the end of the 19th century, and the colonial governance arrangements became increasingly sophisticated throughout the 20th Century and into the 21st.
After the 1960 adoption by the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly of the landmark Decolonisation Declaration (2), and its companion resolution defining full self-government (3), many of the dependencies of the region achieved a full measure of self-government through political independence, or via free association or integration with another country. Decolonisation effectively stalled at the beginning of the 1990’s owing to diminished attention paid to the process in the international euphoria following the end of the Cold War (4). Almost two decades into the 21st Century, six territories administered by the UK and one by the US are formally listed by the U.N. as non self-governing (5). The one U.S. commonwealth and two Dutch associated countries are arguably more autonomous governance models, and were formally removed from UN oversight by General Assembly resolution. The three overseas departments of France are self-governing through political integration and the exercise of full political rights within the French Republic.
II. Governance in the Non-Independent Caribbean
For the dependencies under U.K. administration - in particular, the Turks and Caicos Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, British Virgin Islands, Anguilla and to a lesser extent Bermuda, there is a “direct role by the cosmopole in the daily governing process via the reserved and other constitutional powers set aside for the U.K.-appointed governor in such areas as external affairs, internal security, and the civil service. The governor’s powers to annul, and to decline to assent to legislation adopted by the elected legislative body of the territory, is also noted. The additional authority of the governor to impose legislation unilaterally on the territory without the consent and often against the will of the elected government (6) has been termed in the U.K. House of Commons as the “nuclear option.” Collectively, these constitutionally-granted powers to an un-elected official from the cosmopole is illustrative of a continued democratic deficit in the U.K.-administered territories.
A more indirect approach characterises the U.S. governance of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Since the advent of the elected governorship in both territories replacing the appointed governor, direct executive power from Washington became less evident, save for U.S. jurisdiction over land and marine resources, administrative control of the territorial borders and increasing hands-on management in other areas. From a legislative perspective, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands which are appurtenant to, but not part of the U.S., are governed by the territorial clause of the U.S. Constitution which gives the U.S. Congress plenary authority to unilaterally apply U.S. laws (7). Both territories have active non-voting delegates to the U.S. House of Representatives, with no provision for representation in the U.S. Senate, and no vote in U.S. presidential elections. This compares with the absence of representation of any kind in the U.K. House of Commons for the U.K.–administered territories in the Caribbean.
On the other hand, the self-governing countries of Aruba and the five-island grouping of the Netherlands Antilles, in association with the Kingdom of the Netherlands, combine relative autonomous powers with aspects of political integration, e.g. shared citizenship (8). This is similar to the constitutional arrangement between Greenland and the Faroe Islands vis a vis the Kingdom of Denmark. Both Dutch and Danish dependency models are characterised by voting representation in the parliaments of the Netherlands and Denmark, respectively, coupled with the exercise of effective autonomy. As noted, the French overseas departments of Guadeloupe (and its dependencies), Martinique, and French Guiana enjoy full political integration synonymous with the integrated island state of Hawaii.
III. Distinctions and Perceptions of Political Identity
Political identity in the non-independent Caribbean is greatly influenced by the distinctions between dependence and associated governance. For the dependent territories, such rights are governed by several considerations. The extent to which the elected government can legislate cultural and political identity is a primary factor, and is determined by the degree of autonomy of the prevailing constitutional arrangement. Clearly, the U.K. territories have more constitutional flexibility in this area, as they were never regarded as “part of the U.K.”
In this context, significant variation exists between the U.K. and U.S. dependency models, which contrasts with the exercise of autonomous power in the Caribbean jurisdictions associated with the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Regarding the U.K. dependency model, Bourne asserts that:
“There was never confusion concerning the differing status of those British citizens who settled in the colonies and their descendants on one hand, and the people of the territory on the other (9). ”
These distinctions were understood even after the adoption in 2002 of the British Overseas Territories Act, amending the British Nationality Act of 1981, which changed the nomenclature from British dependent territories citizenship to overseas territories citizenship, while simultaneously conferring British citizenship on the people of the UK-administered territories (10). The limits on the rights granted with the conferred citizenship were made abundantly clear by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in 2001 during the second reading of the legislation in the House of Commons, in which he stated:
“The(British Overseas Territories) Bill is about nationality. British citizenship (to be extended) carries with it the right of abode in the United Kingdom and the right of free movement in Europe, but (does not offer) other rights and obligations, including the right to preferential rates for tertiary education, health and social security benefits and the vote in UK parliamentary elections…” (11)
Dependency governance in the U.S. territories, on the other hand, reflects concepts of territorial “ownership.” (12) Both models are contrasted with the freely-associated political status models of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruban which acknowledge a distinct political and cultural identity of the islands different than that of the Dutch Kingdom.
Another consideration with respect to the dependent territories is very much a matter of self-perception in relation to the interplay between cultural/national identity and citizenship, coupled with the diversity of national origin of the population. In the British territories, the perception of cultural and political identity is understood in an island-specific, ‘nationalist’ context, e.g. a person is ‘Bermudian’ or ‘Anguillan,’ as opposed to being ‘British.’ This is well-defined in the respective constitutions and territorial laws discussed later. This contrasts with the U.S. Virgin Islands where public expressions often mistakenly equate identity with U.S. citizenship. Increasingly, ‘Virgin Islanders’ are defined as ‘African-Americans,’ perhaps initially for ease of reference in federal funding categories, but later acquiring a broader usage. However, the mere combination of cultural descent with citizenship in this manner is mis-guided, since the category is intended for a different set of African-descendent people who went through a specific historical and cultural experience in the continental U.S.
Perspectives on cultural and political identity in the dependent territories are also influenced by demographics. In the U.K. dependencies, there are significant numbers of Caribbean nationals who exercise fundamental rights, but maintain political rights only through their country of origin, except in the cases where long-term residency has led to naturalization. Further, the work permit programmes governing the residency of the non-naturalised Caribbean nationals in the U.K. territories is often governed by territorial ‘turnover laws’ requiring the person to return to their country of origin after a defined period, with varying degrees of privilege to return. Degrees of social dislocation can result from this practice, particularly as related to school-age students who may have been born in the dependent territory but enjoy only the full citizenship of their parents. This contrasts with the immediate grant of U.S. citizenship under U.S. law for children born in the U.S. territories and who can also claim the citizenship of their parents.
For the U.S. territories, Puerto Rico with a population exceeding 4 million has had little need historically for additional labour, notwithstanding the large Dominican Republic community which is integral to economic sustainability. For the U.S. Virgin Islands, the need for additional labour to build and service a fast-growing tourism industry in the wake of the U.S. travel embargo on Cuba resulted in significant population growth through immigration from the wider region. Leibowitz indicated that the numbers reached 34,000 between 1960 - 1970, exceeding the entire 1960 population of the territory. (13) The temporary worker system which had been legislated by the U.S. Congress pursuant to U.S. immigration laws facilitated the movement of mainly African descendents from other parts of the Caribbean to the U.S. Virgin Islands to meet growing labour needs. Concerned with the projected financial impact of the extension of public services to the new residents, the U.S. Virgin Islands legislature sought to use its local authority to regulate access to education, housing and other areas. This was later overturned by the U.S. courts and applicability of U.S. equal protection laws. A specific U.S. immigration measure enacted in 1981 also provided for a process of achieving permanent residency status in the territory, and ultimately U.S. citizenship.
This comparison in the migration of people to the U.K. and U.S. territories does not suggest favour of one system over the other, since many people experienced significant violation of their worker’s rights under both systems in relation to externally-owned development projects and establishments. The main objective here is to portray how the development of the two respective dependency models went on to impact the advancement of political and cultural identity. Accordingly, in both the U.K. and U.S. dependencies, a diverse population evolved which included migration from the wider region.
In this regard, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in its 1988 Factbook defined the population of the territory as “74 per cent West Indian (including) 45 per cent born in the (U.S.) Virgin Islands and 29 per cent born elsewhere in the West Indies.” This assessment, perhaps inadvertently, served to confirm the existence of a collective cultural Caribbean identity among the predominately African descendents in the territory. It has been hypothesized that the migrants from the wider Caribbean who came to the U.S. Virgin Islands in the 1960’s might have been the descendents of those Africans who escaped slavery in the Danish West Indies for freedom in the British controlled Caribbean in the preceding century. A genealogical study is not attempted here. The main point is that a unified Caribbean dynamic was a potential basis of a modern paradigm of cultural - and by extension - political identity in the U.S. Virgin Islands, encompassing the prevailing demographic reality. However, the logical extension of such a force might have been a process of natural political evolution that would have been inconsistent with the legitimisation, and subsequent modernisation of dependency governance.
Within this framework, four constitutional conventions in the U.S. Virgin Islands were held between 1964 and 1980. Quite apart from the mandate to create/re-create structures of government through a local constitution to replace the U.S. Revised Organic Act of 1954 was the task of defining/re-defining a political and cultural identity amid changing demographics. The territory’s political status commission of the 1990s had also struggled with similar issues which contributed to a lack of conclusive result in the 1993 status referendum. The Fifth Constitutional Convention, to its significant credit, was undergoing serious analysis of these issues at the end of 2008 into 2009 despite the confines of the existing dependency relationship, even as the exercise was not designed to tackle the fundamental question of political status.
IV. Political and Cultural Identity in Dependency Constitutions
The prevailing constitutions of the U.K. territories in the Caribbean have always acknowledged a separate political identity of the people of the territory vis a vis that of the metropole. This was an important feature of the most recent constitutional review processes underway or completed in five of the six territories (excluding Bermuda) pursuant to the 1999 U.K. Government’s White Paper on Partnership for Progress and Prosperity. In this connection, the British Virgin Islands Constitutional Commissioners in their 2005 recommendations on ‘modernising’ the territory’s constitution addressed a number of relevant issues including the fine-tuning of the “belonger status” and the “preservation of numerical pre-dominance, heritage and culture of indigenous people,” (14) reflective of an ‘island specific nationalist’ focus cited earlier. The Virgin Islands Constitutional Order 2007 ultimately issued by the U.K. reflected much of this thinking.
Accordingly, the first paragraph of the preamble of the new constitution recognised that “… the people of the territory of the (British) Virgin Islands have over centuries evolved with a distinct cultural identity which is the essence of a Virgin Islander.” The preamble also “recall(ed) that because of historical, economic and other reasons many of the people of the Virgin Islands reside elsewhere but have and continue to have an ancestral connection and bond with those Islands.” The new constitution which entered into force in 2007 detailed the criteria for a person who “belongs” to the British Virgin Islands, primarily based on birth or descent, and extends the right to hold elective office in the House of Assembly to this population. (15) A later provision of the preamble “affirm(ed) that the people of the (British) Virgin Islands have generally expressed their desire…to exercise the highest degree of control over the affairs of their country…” This self-recognition of the territory as a country distinct from the U.K. confirms the recognition by the people of a separate political uniqueness, that is, the distinction between their collective political identity and whatever citizenship may be conferred upon them (or subsequently removed) by external legislation. Such recognition of identity is reflected in most constitutions of U.K. territories in the Caribbean, and differs from prevailing views in the U.S. Virgin Islands. On this point, Bourne observed in 2005 that:
“at present, the people of most non self-governing territories other than the U.S. Virgin Islands see their identity as separate from that of their administering power… (while) what we hear in the U.S. Virgin Islands are efforts to accomplish a change to political integration, such as obtaining the presidential vote, being treated as a state with respect to benefit programs, etc., without having a clear analysis of what our present status entitles us to and the overall effect of such political changes.” (16)
In the case of Puerto Rico, a strong political and cultural identity is protected by the insulating predominance of the Spanish language, coupled with a population size far exceeding any other island dependency and large reinforcing diaspora. The complexities of the Puerto Rican ethos significantly influence the territory’s political discourse, while maintaining the unifying thread of cultural identity. This is largely shared by the Puerto Rican people irrespective of their views on a permanent political status achievable through U.S. statehood, free association or integration (17); or on maintaining the accommodation with what Boden describes as “voluntary colonialism with the promise of a completely new form of metropolitan/colony relationship.” (18)
With the control of the executive and legislative branches of the Puerto Rico Government shifting to the pro-integrationist New Progressive Party in January 2009, exertions of distinct political identity typical of the pro-autonomous Popular Democratic Party through active international organisation representation among other manifestations could be reversed if previous changes of power from the autonomous to the integrationist parties are any indication. Regardless of the change in political status preference with the incoming ruling party, however, provisions of the Puerto Rico Constitution maintain important manifestations of identity, in particular the primacy of the Spanish language and the recognition of a Puerto Rican citizenship as a requirement for serving in the Legislative Assembly. (19) Neither can be “wiped away so easily.”
In the Turks and Caicos, the new 2006 constitution confirms belonger status as a manifestation of cultural identity, and as a fundamental criteria for election to the House of Assembly (20), and voter eligibility, without providing further elaboration on the definition as is the case in the 2007 constitution of the British Virgin Islands (21) and in the 1990 amendment to the Anguilla Constitutional Order of 1982 (22). The 2008 Anguillan proposal to the U.K. for full internal self-government is further illustration of a strong collective political identity.
Montserrat and the Cayman Islands continue to proceed in reviewing and recommending changes to their existing constitutions with emphasis on the transfer of varying degrees of power from the un-elected governor to the democratically-elected governments. This reflects the evolution of heightened political maturity in both territories and an “island-centric” approach in the case of the Cayman Islands, as compared to a more regional orientation for Montserrat, whose request to join the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) has been blocked by the U.K.
Both the prevailing 1990 Anguilla constitution and the new 2007 British Virgin Islands constitution reaffirm cultural identity through defining “belonger” status explicit in their document for the purpose of identification, and by extension, as a qualification to hold elective office. Further, the British Virgin Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands sought and obtained additional administrative authority in their new constitutions as a confirmation of a strong political identity separate from the metropole. This is evident in the active participation of all six U.K. territories as associate or full members in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and its myriad of associated bodies, and in the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS).
In the U.K. territories, such engagement in regional affairs is usually sustained even following a change of government since ideological distinctions between political parties are narrow, and the recognition of the importance of regional engagement virtually universal. This contrasts with Puerto Rico where the ideological divide among integrationist, autonomist and independence political forces has formed the very basis of political party allegiances for decades. In the US Virgin Islands, the development of a collective political identity through similar international organisation participation had actually exceeded that of Puerto Rico for significant periods during the last quarter century, but has appears unsustainable, largely based on conflicting U.S. policy which isolates U.S. territories from the same regional institutions in which the U.K. territories enjoy membership. This strategy of isolation based on overly strict constitutional interpretations serves to reinforce dependency governance.
For the Cayman Islands, the 1972 Constitution, amended on five occasions through 2003, recognises a “Caymanian Status” for eligibility to be elected as a member of the Legislative Assembly with ancestral ties to the territory either by birth or through at least one parent (23), and for qualifying as an elector (24). Regarding Montserrat, the House of Assembly in its 2002 Report of the Committee of the Whole approved a number of recommendations of its Constitutional Commissioners which had called for a strengthened political identity. In this connection, the Committee approved, inter alia, the recommendations that regional affairs and international finance be placed within the competence of the elected government, that legislative members should be required to swear an oath to the people of Montserrat, that a free association arrangement should be pursued, and that nativity should be a criteria for citizenship.
Bermuda, unlike the other U.K. territories in the Atlantic/Caribbean which proceeded with post-1999 formal reviews of their individual constitutions, did not participate in the review process as it already has an advanced constitution (short of free association, given the maintenance of the governor’s reserved powers), with any further constitutional advancement recognised as a move to independence (where the governor’s powers would no longer apply). In that connection, the Bermuda Independence Commission was created in 2004 to assess the implications of an independent Bermuda, the ultimate expression of collective political identity. The exhaustive report of the commission made a series of recommendations to advance a public dialogue and engage the business sector on the changes that would be brought about through independence, to clarify post independence citizenship issues, and to review all international opportunities.
As the process of dialogue continues, the existent 1968 constitution (25) as amended most recently in 2003, provides similar expressions cultural identity as contained in other U.K. constitutions, including the recognition of a Bermudian status similar in scope to the belonger status of other U.K. territories. The strong political identity of Bermuda is manifest in the advanced powers the territory exercises, and to which many of the other territories aspire.
V. Political and Cultural Identity in Caribbean Autonomous Countries
As earlier cited, the very nature of the autonomy inherent in a political association arrangement provides for a high degree of political identity, as confirmed by international law and principles (26). This is clear in the 1954 Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as amended, which sets forth the equality of the countries of Holland, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba (27). In this connection, the Charter provides for each of the three countries to “conduct their internal interests autonomously, and their common interests on a basis of equality.” Generally, the Kingdom maintains control over defence, foreign relations and nationality, with the option to exercise financial control through ‘higher supervision’ in the event of extraordinary circumstances necessitating a temporary assumption of financial control by the Kingdom government (28).
The autonomous Antilles model also provides for aspects of political integration as detailed in the Kingdom Charter, with membership in the Dutch Council of Ministers set aside for the Ministers Plenipotentiary of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, respectively (29). Further representation is provided for in the Dutch Council of State in relation to the capacity to influence decisions on the applicability of Kingdom laws and regulations. There are also mechanisms for mutual consent precluding the applicability of certain Kingdom laws, as well as international and financial agreements. On regional and international participation, the Kingdom generally supports the membership of participation of the Netherlands Antilles as a matter of course.
In the context of cultural identity, as in the case of Puerto Rico, linguistic autonomy plays a major part in the expression of cultural identity in specific islands. The indigenous language of Papimentu predominates in Curacao, Bonaire and Aruba, and in 2007 was made one of the official languages in the Netherlands Antilles.
In the wake of the acquisition of separate country status (status aparte) of Aruba in 1986, a series of referenda were held in the remaining five islands on the political future of the Netherlands Antilles, resulting in the initiation of discussions to dismantle the five-island associated country. Both Curacao and Sint Maarten chose ‘separate country’ status, and after intense negotiations - under significant pressure with debt relief hanging in the balance - agreements were made for the two jurisdictions to gain the new status, albeit with significant reduction in autonomy presently held by the five-island grouping before the dismantlement scheduled for October of 2010.
The islands of Bonaire, Saba and St. Eustatius chose what was characterised as ‘direct ties’ with the Dutch Kingdom. That status, however, turned out to be a form of partial integrated overseas provincial status (‘public entities’). As such, the Kingdom Government is set to replace local administrative power, in extenso, with the final parameters still being finalised at the beginning of 2010. Bonaire, on the other hand, had a different understanding of “direct ties,” which did not mean ‘partial integration.’ They have scheduled a new referendum in March, 2010 with the internationally recognised political status option of free association along with the now-revealed ‘public entity’ status on the ballot.
It was reported in the Bonaire media that the United Nations had (curiously) termed as ‘problematic’ the residency period for voter eligibility in the upcoming referendum, arguing that it would exclude some Dutch citizens from participation. The question, of course, is whether this would be a referendum for the people of Bonaire, or for the Dutch citizens in Bonaire. International law confirms the right of people, in an act of self-determination, to determine specific eligibility criteria.
Conclusion
It should be emphasized that issues of identity in the non-independent Caribbean are multidimensional, and fundamentally linked to variables such as the nature of the prevailing political status and its prospects for evolution, the size and national origin of the population and cultural manifestations such as language, heritage and other traditions. These remain considerable factors in the evolution of identity in the countries of the non-independent Caribbean, and can often serve to divert attention from the development of a unified national ethos.
Caribbean regional integration initiatives such as the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME), as well as the Eastern Caribbean - Trinidad and Tobago unity discussions, for example, are important to the reaffirmation/reinforcement of a Caribbean commonality. Should such processes which promote a unified Caribbean identity be embraced or rejected, in full or in part, by the dependencies and associated states which comprise the non-independent Caribbean? Conversely, should they pursue a direction towards reinforcement of the present dependency-cosmopolitan dynamic which would continue to influence an emergence of an alter ego? What are the implications of either approach given the changing global dynamic precipitated by fundamental shifts in the world economy, planetary implications of the failure to achieve a binding treaty on climate change, and the scramble for access to what’s left of the natural resources of the planet by those states which regard their colonial/associated political relationships with non-independent Caribbean countries as a foothold for the extension of exclusive economic zones? Contemporary international relations in the 21st Century must factor in the dynamic of the non-independent Caribbean in all of its manifestations as decisions on constitutional reform will most certainly have an impact on the cultural and political identity of this component of the Caribbean region.
Notes
1) Corbin, Carlyle. 2006. Decolonisation and Self-Government of Curacao. pp.5-6. A paper presented at the University of the Netherlands Antilles by Dr. Carlyle Corbin, Curacao, Netherlands Antilles, 1st June 2006.
2) U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), December 14, 1960.
3) U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), December 15, 1960.
4) Corbin, Carlyle. (1997). A Plan of Action for the Self-Determination of the Remaining Non Self-Governing Territories. A paper delivered to the United Nations Caribbean Regional Seminar, Antigua and Barbuda. pp. 1-3.
5)Report of the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonisation for 2008, Official Records, U.N. General Assembly (A/63/23) 30th June 2008; pp. 1-2.
6) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 62/118. 17 December 2007.
7) United States Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(2).
8) Igarashi, Masahiro. 2002. Associated Statehood in International Law. The Hague, London, New York: Kluwer Law International. pp. 62-65.
9) Bourne, Judith. (2005). The Ambiguity of our U.S. Citizenship. A Paper delivered at a forum of the Virgin Islands Humanities Council, St. John, Virgin Islands. p.3.
10) British Overseas Territories Act. (2002). Section 3.
11) Speech by Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Ben Bradshaw. Second reading of the Overseas Territories Bill. House of Commons. London, 22 November 2001.
12) 7 op. cit.
13) Leibowitz, Arnold H.(1989). Defining Status: a Comprehensive Analysis of United States Territorial Relations. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. pp. 278-284.
14) Report of the Constitutional Commission (2005). Government of the Virgin Islands. Recommendations 16-32.
15) The Virgin Islands Constitutional Order 2007. Section 2(2)( a) – (h) and Section 65 (1) – (4).
16) 9 op. cit. p. 3.
17) Report by the President’s Task Force on Puerto Rico’s Status. (2005). P. 10.
18) Boden, Roy J.A. (2007). The Cayman Islands in Transition. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle. pp. 39-40.
19) Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Article III, Section 5. (1952).
20) The Turks and Caicos Islands Constitutional Order 2006. Section 44(c).
21) 18 op. cit. Section 49 (1)(b)(iii).
22) Anguilla Constitutional (Amendment) Order 1990. Section 25.
23) Cayman Islands (Constitution) Order 1972. Article 18(1) (a), and Article 18 (2) (b).
24) 21 op. cit. Article 25 (b).
25) Bermuda Constitutional Order 1968.
26) 3 op. cit. Annex
27) Documents on International Relations in the Caribbean, University of the West Indies and University of Puerto Rico. (1970)
28) The Netherlands Antilles is comprised of Curacao, Bonaire, Saba, St. Eustatius and Sint Maarten. Aruba attained separate status aparte in 1986 as the third country in the Kingdom, filling the vacancy left by the independence of Suriname.
29) Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (1954 as amended). Article 7.
29 January 2010
The Native Papers - Part III
This is Part III of "The Native Papers" written by Virgin Islands historian Gerard Emanuel. Part I dealt with the Historical and Legal Bases for the Definition of a Native Virgin Islander. Part II addressed the right to self-determination.
_______________________________________________________________________________
PART III. The Native Virgin Islander - An Endangered Species
by Gerard M. Emanuel
Native Virgin Islanders residing in the Virgin Islands, particularly on St. John, are an endangered species. The last census indicated that they are now a minority. (See U.S. Census records.) The U.S. has all kinds of laws to protect endangered life forms such as the Bald Eagle, turtles, eggs, pandas, buffalo, certain lobsters, fish and plants. Here in the V.I. we have laws to protect turtles, eggs, sand, coral reefs, mangroves, Mahogany Trees and native lizards. For the latter, efforts have even been made to reduce if not eliminate their predators. Many of us do not seem to have a problem when plants and animals are singled out for special treatment from others in their populations, because they are endangered. If this is true, I am curious as to why some persons consider it unfairly discriminatory and “un-American” to similarly single out from others in the local population, a group that the federal government’s official records indicate has been diminishing with each census count. Moreover, research from the University of the Virgin Islands (UVI) Eastern Caribbean Center (ECC) confirmed this fact when it conclusively showed that V.I. women have been getting a smaller number of children each time a count was done between 1970 and 2005. (See Research News from UVI/ECC, Dec. 2007, Vol. 1, Issue1, pp.1-4).
How could it be acceptable to be so concerned about preserving animals and plants and unacceptable to be similarly concerned about preserving a people, when solid data over the past 35 years clearly shows that Native Virgin Islanders are also disappearing? If I get a truthful answer to this question, I will be surprised. Unlike other life forms, a people possess an ethos. This can be defined as their guiding beliefs, fundamental values, thought processes, etc., that distinguish them from other groups. Ethos can also be defined as the distinctive spirit of a people or an era. Native Virgin Islanders had a distinct set of traits, which secured their survival up until the mid 1960’s. At that time, the population started to grow more from in-migration than from births. A population that was 26,000 in 1950 and 74% native, grew to almost 50,000 in 1965, and dropped to 44% native. While the native population only grew from 19,600 to 22,000, the number of non-citizen immigrants, went from 1,000 in 1950, which was 4% of the population, to 2,000 ten years later.
However, this segment of the population mushroomed by 500% from 2,000 to 10,000 in only five years (1960 to 1965), and became 20% of the population. I do not know of any other place as small as the V.I. that had such a great increase in its immigrant population in such a short period of time, without undergoing massive social, infrastructural and other problems. In fact, a court case was necessary at the end of the 1960’s to allow non-citizen children to attend public schools, partially because officials were concerned about the impact the tremendous increase in students would have on the school system. (See Hosier v. Evans, 1970)
In the mid 1960’s, for the first time in the 20th century, Native Virgin Islanders became a minority in their homeland. There were other impacts, some positive and some negative, of the demographic changes of the 1960’s. The V.I. experienced an economic boom like it has never seen either before or since. The government had surpluses in many of those years. Construction boomed. Tourist arrivals and spending increased. Real estate sales grew exponentially. Virgin Islanders grew a large “middle class”. Healthcare improved. Roads improved, etc. However, in spite of all these gains, Virgin Islanders lost their home. What had been primarily a home to natives, now was transformed (in less than one quarter of a generation), into an American playground and a place where the majority of people, were immigrants. Many of these persons had come to these islands principally for economic gain. Their contributions were invaluable to the economic boom of the 1960’s. Most natives in hindsight are thankful for their presence. Nevertheless, only a minority of immigrants seemed genuinely interested in unifying with all of the people, and developing a sense of community or nationalism. The rest were too busy making money, much of which was sent out of these islands as remittances.
Because of the ill treatment many had received by some natives, and by the federal government, former immigrants created benevolent associations. These organizations provided assistance not only to resident immigrants who were mistreated, but also to their relatives “back home” whether home meant the mainland U.S., the Caribbean or other parts of the world.
Now one might assume that natives led a large, well organized, discriminatory movement similar to what occurred by the Ku Klux Klan and other racists mostly in the southern United States. Such was not the case. In fact, immigrants who were “bonded”, left for the U.S. when they were not supposed to and natives who had sponsored them or loaned them money, experienced losses.
As the 1960’s, came to an end, the traditional ethos of Virgin Islanders changed as well. Many persons went from being community oriented and other-directed, (living in the “big yard”, or in “long-row” homes, where a matriarch was always home to exert discipline on the wayward), to being experts in the ethic of individualism and materialism. Virgin Islanders lost the practice of the village raising the child as an essential facet of social discipline and control in their culture. It has been said over and over, (and I can personally attest to this), that when you walked on the street, regardless of whether it was on St. John, St. Thomas or St. Croix before the mid ‘60’s, there seemed to be a network of matriarchs watching you like “big brother”. If you did anything wrong or did not properly greet them when you passed their home or business, your parents were informed before you returned. Corporal punishment was swift and without any questions being asked. This was because there existed a great sense of trust that Virgin Islanders had in the integrity of these matriarchs. All who lived in a particular community were like an extended family, whether related by blood or not. If a matriarch did not know your first name, she definitely knew “to whom you belonged”, and could identify you as Miss ___’s child.
This means of social control reduced crime and kept communities together. Almost all of this and more of the pre 1960’s ethos were lost by the 1970’s. The new ethos of many Virgin Islanders mimicked aspects of North American culture that were invading their homeland and thrown in their faces daily. The tourism demonstration effect, the impact of television and other media, particularly from the United States, eroded the old and swept in this new ethos. Natives became preoccupied with trying to get the “Almighty Dollar” in order to engage in “conspicuous consumption”, and “keep up with the Jones’s”. They attempted to get every new product they saw on television. They seemed to forget the values that had preserved and protected them as a unified and proud people with a distinct culture, when they were poorer. Now they adopted some of the best but more of the worst characteristics of American culture, and the cultural complexion of the Virgin Islands experienced a face and body lift.
Today, natives are still trying to adjust and cope with the staggering results of this mammoth demographic increase along with the shift in their status from majority to minority and the adoption of a North American value system. Some of the other negative results of these changes were double-sessions in public schools, increased water shortages, electrical outages, greater impact on health and social services, roads, housing, increased crime, and the terrible treatment of immigrants from other Caribbean islands.
Our brothers and sisters from the rest of the Caribbean became the scapegoat for almost everything that was wrong in these islands, and were unfairly discriminated against as an unjustifiable reaction to their increasing numbers and the decreasing number of natives. Some Virgin Islanders felt threatened, became somewhat xenophobic but did not unite to protect and preserve their interests.
The above paragraphs may seem like a digression, but one cannot understand present day V.I. society without knowing, understanding and respecting the difference between pre and post 1960’s V.I. society and the impact of those massive changes from the perspective of natives. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, some natives began again to migrate to the U.S. Their presence in the population continued to dwindle and their culture and traditions started to disappear. All might have been lost had it not been for a few tradition bearers, who in spite of overwhelming odds, fought to preserve what semblance of pre-1960 culture they could remember. Every time a group of native people becomes extinct for whatever reason, all of the things, which they can contribute to the rich diversity of the human family, are lost.
The essence of this issue is first knowing and second accepting the existence of an endangered group of “people of” the Virgin Islands. The third part of this is respect. Once persons not only can do these things, but also see the value in doing so, then they can hopefully see the need for protection and preservation of this group in order that the “distinguishing character, and guiding beliefs” of this group and its culture, will survive and be promoted here in their homeland. You cannot say you want to preserve the culture and traditions of a people and not simultaneously acknowledge and respect the people as a distinct entity that also needs to be preserved. How can you have classical or traditional V.I. culture without the people from whom it emanated? This is the heart of the matter. To this end, laws have to be enacted in the constitution, and policies have to be implemented.
Native Virgin Islanders, who know and ground their research-based opinions in the knowledge and practice of their own ethos first and in the history of the U.S. and its relationships with territories second, have been called racist and un-American. This is what foments the unnecessary divisiveness. Supporting the preservation of native rights should not be divisive. This has to be even more important than doing the same when it comes to animals, plants and geographic areas. Areas that require special protection are called APC’s. A people who require the same consideration are called endangered natives. In other parts of the world, when natives start to disappear, special laws are enacted for their preservation. Instead of name-calling, let us work together to achieve mutual understanding and consensus in a way that respects all of our rights.
It has appeared from the discussions on talk shows and in editorials, that consensus means acknowledging and protecting the rights of every one but the native. Every time natives start to talk about their rights, they are brow-beaten by others, who sometimes understand neither them nor their history of oppression, colonization and current need to exercise self-determination without interference. Virgin Islanders must have the right to choose who will be invited to make important decisions along with them. This should be done at a minimum. If any group’s rights are to be accorded priority in the Virgin Islands, especially when it comes to respect and protection, it has to be the rights of the natives. How can the rights of the indigenes of a place be less important than those of immigrants, whether they are foreigners or U.S. citizens? In societies where native rights are ignored, the natives become extinct or are severely marginalized in every way in their own home. What comes to mind is the story of the camel that requested to be able to put a foot in a man’s tent to protect it from the cold. The man, being kind in nature agreed, but as the night wore on, the camel kept on asking for more and more space. The man gave in until the camel eventually took over the tent and the man to whom the tent was home, found himself placed out in the cold. This man must have been a Native Virgin Islander, because part of the pre-1960 ethos of Virgin Islanders, involved treating others better than they treated themselves.
This story is very relevant to the Native Virgin Islander dilemma. As such, it is time for Natives to learn from the painful lessons of their history. Some persons who come here act like the camel. They get upset when natives tell them that they do not have the same right to exercise decisions of self-determination and self-government here as much as the native does. In some instances, these persons even feel that they have more rights. Since they came from America, which owns these islands as property, and since they have “their 14th amendment” American citizenship, these persons may feel that these facts give them as much or even more right to be here than the native, since natives are not 14th amendment citizens, and are merely part of the property that the U.S. owns. None of them will ever put it in such stark terms. They will couch their views and justifications in all kinds of euphemisms such as freedom, democracy, 14th amendment equal protection rights and protections, etc. As discussed in a previous article, when viewed from the perspective of our colonizers, especially regarding citizenship, they are right. However, when viewed from the perspective of natives, which makes these matters questions of self-determination and self-government, they are wrong. We must be able to come to some sensible compromise on these issues where the rights of everyone are respected, but with priority accorded to the historical context of oppression and colonialism experienced by the natives. This hopefully can be done without persons getting upset. However, we must not be afraid of emotions as long as they are guided by reason.
From the perspective of the United States, Virgin Islanders and their homeland are viewed constitutionally as mere property that it owns. I thought that the slave trade had ended 200 years ago, and that slavery in these islands ended in 1848. I probably am wrong, but I cannot see myself being overjoyed with being considered as property. Recently, Virgin Islanders observed the 90th anniversary of the “sale of these islands and their people” to the U.S. Yes we have made much progress under U.S. rule, but none of it was willingly granted. Our foremothers and fathers had to struggle and endure many trials and tribulations to eke out what semblance of “self-government” exists here. (If you have the delusion that we have true self-government, simply examine Section 8 of the Revised Organic Act of 1954, or review the history of unilateral changes that the U.S. has made to laws and regulations here. in order to become disillusioned. Sometimes these changes have adversely affected the people of these islands). The most recent examples were the changes that affected the EDC beneficiaries and the restrictions on fishing. This may be why the source of U.S. governmental authority over this territory, even after 90 years of U.S. colonial rule, still is the pejorative Territorial Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which gives Congress full control over territory and property. (A careful reading of this clause will reveal that “Territory” means property). (See the citation below.)
“ The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States (...)”
Why isn’t Congressional authority over the V.I. located under Article I, where most of the powers of Congress are outlined? The same occurs with the District Courts. Authority over them comes from Article IV, instead of Article III. The difference is degrading in terms of independence, salary and tenure for District Court judges here. Therefore, Virgin Islanders are treated as property, and their sustained right to U.S. citizenship at birth may be tenuous at best. Remember Supreme Court Justice Brown said that unincorporated territories like the V.I. are “appurtenant to, but not a part of the United States…”. Sometimes natives feel that their friends and officials from the U.S. mainland act as though Virgin Islanders really are personal property just as a dog or a cat are the personal property of their owners. If this is the mentality of the persons who criticize natives for wanting to be treated as free humans, then I understand their reasoning, even though I totally disagree with it.
Being American does not have to mean what Arthur Schlesinger meant by it in “The Disuniting of America”. He wanted it to mean that all persons were to melt into some pot and lose the cultural distinctiveness they brought to this country. His analysis of the dangers of focusing too much on our racial and ethnic differences as retarding national unity, however, is accurate and very relevant to the V.I. situation. His melting pot concept only was applicable when America was considered to be a “white” country, where only Caucasians were the de-facto authentic citizens. Non-whites could never hope to “melt” in Mr. Schlesinger’s racial and ethnic pot. Their physical characteristics would always stand out and make them visually distinct from the majority of the Caucasian population. Thus, only the whites had the option legitimately “melting” into the pot.
Some persons still think that this is how America is supposed to be. However, it is not. Just like this cannot happen in the Virgin Islands, the time for this definition of being American has gone and has now evolved to mean subscribing to the ethos of the founding fathers with one key distinction. We the people must now mean all of the people. Being American today is like being part of a tossed salad. The new paradigm in the Virgin Islands just as in the U.S. must now be that all cultural groups are invited here, and while retaining elements of their cultural distinctiveness, they also need to subscribe to, respect and identify with the cultural traditions of Virgin Islanders. This may just be the win-win answer to unity in the Virgin Islands. This “tossed salad” concept is more nutritious and respectful than the melting pot). Food that has been melted has been denatured, and most of the essential live-giving properties have been destroyed. If the pot itself melts, whatever is in it will be poisoned. Is this what we want for our peoples and cultures? A tossed salad retains all of the life-giving properties of its constituent parts, while making a whole. However, the lettuce, which provides the foundation, is the main ingredient. The natives, their history, traditions and aspirations are the lettuce in the Virgin Islands’ tossed salad society. You do not have an authentic, traditional tossed salad without lettuce as the base.
Possibly, due to their belief in the assimilative or American melting pot theory, some of our friends do not even want to acknowledge the existence of the native people of the Virgin Islands, who have a distinct ethos that is rapidly disappearing. All they see is “America” and the American ethos here. They see little value in preserving Johnny cake and maufe. Believe it or not, I partially agree. It is not only the physical manifestations of a culture and a people that constitute their ethos. It is principally their values, the basis for them and the left and right brain processes they used to produce the excellent material products of their culture, notwithstanding the limitations imposed upon them by slavery and colonization. Probably the greatest aspect of our culture, is the way we think and solve problems, which is also inextricably intertwined with our language and other important non-material aspects of our culture. The physical manifestations could change, but when the non-material intellectual and spiritual ones disappear, the culture begins to decay and eventually may become extinct.
Anyhow, as far as some mainland V.I. residents are concerned, Virgin Islanders should be viewed as a monolithic group of assimilated Americans living here. Other than a few superficial expressions of our traditions, here should become a carbon copy of “downtown” America. Students of history like me should deny their education, forget this divisive, discriminatory foolishness about ethos and native rights, and simply just get along.
Get along according to whose definitions, worldview, ethos and most importantly, whose interests? Even in my former labor union, the charter members have more privileges than the members who came after; regardless of how long they serve in the union, how many strikes they have endured, etc. Special consideration is always given to those pioneers who endured the rigors of forming an organization. They are able to attend all functions freely and are recognized for their ground-breaking work. Why can’t the persons who are not the charter members of V.I. society, or their descendants understand and accept this principle?
One thing that the 1960’s taught conscious Africans living in this part of the world is that in order to survive, you must clearly unite, organize, define yourself and your interests for yourself, based on the specific context provided by your worldview, history, culture and other circumstances. As Professor Janice Hale of Clark University once wrote, “The power to define is the power to destroy.” You then need to find likeminded persons to help in the attainment of these interests. I wonder how many of us would even consider telling a Jew to forget his history, especially the holocaust and simply try to get along with the descendants of Nazis since they might be ideologically against what their forefathers promoted under Hitler? If the holocaust of Jews, which entitled them to receive reparations can be respected, why can’t the hundreds of years of African holocausts similarly be recognized, respected and the descendants similarly compensated by ensuring their ability to not only survive, but also succeed and prosper in their homeland? Who is betraying a racial motive now? Until this kind of respect and sensitivity for the people of the Virgin Islands as an endangered group with a distinct and dying ethos, is shown, there can be no hope for consensus and unity.
As one enlightened African philosopher has said, you cannot have peace without justice. Justice is a pre-condition and must include the recognition of the existence of the Native Virgin Islander as a group that should be protected and preserved at all cost. When this is done, then and only then can we collaborate and pursue peaceful coexistence.
_______________________________________________________________________________
PART III. The Native Virgin Islander - An Endangered Species
by Gerard M. Emanuel
Native Virgin Islanders residing in the Virgin Islands, particularly on St. John, are an endangered species. The last census indicated that they are now a minority. (See U.S. Census records.) The U.S. has all kinds of laws to protect endangered life forms such as the Bald Eagle, turtles, eggs, pandas, buffalo, certain lobsters, fish and plants. Here in the V.I. we have laws to protect turtles, eggs, sand, coral reefs, mangroves, Mahogany Trees and native lizards. For the latter, efforts have even been made to reduce if not eliminate their predators. Many of us do not seem to have a problem when plants and animals are singled out for special treatment from others in their populations, because they are endangered. If this is true, I am curious as to why some persons consider it unfairly discriminatory and “un-American” to similarly single out from others in the local population, a group that the federal government’s official records indicate has been diminishing with each census count. Moreover, research from the University of the Virgin Islands (UVI) Eastern Caribbean Center (ECC) confirmed this fact when it conclusively showed that V.I. women have been getting a smaller number of children each time a count was done between 1970 and 2005. (See Research News from UVI/ECC, Dec. 2007, Vol. 1, Issue1, pp.1-4).
How could it be acceptable to be so concerned about preserving animals and plants and unacceptable to be similarly concerned about preserving a people, when solid data over the past 35 years clearly shows that Native Virgin Islanders are also disappearing? If I get a truthful answer to this question, I will be surprised. Unlike other life forms, a people possess an ethos. This can be defined as their guiding beliefs, fundamental values, thought processes, etc., that distinguish them from other groups. Ethos can also be defined as the distinctive spirit of a people or an era. Native Virgin Islanders had a distinct set of traits, which secured their survival up until the mid 1960’s. At that time, the population started to grow more from in-migration than from births. A population that was 26,000 in 1950 and 74% native, grew to almost 50,000 in 1965, and dropped to 44% native. While the native population only grew from 19,600 to 22,000, the number of non-citizen immigrants, went from 1,000 in 1950, which was 4% of the population, to 2,000 ten years later.
However, this segment of the population mushroomed by 500% from 2,000 to 10,000 in only five years (1960 to 1965), and became 20% of the population. I do not know of any other place as small as the V.I. that had such a great increase in its immigrant population in such a short period of time, without undergoing massive social, infrastructural and other problems. In fact, a court case was necessary at the end of the 1960’s to allow non-citizen children to attend public schools, partially because officials were concerned about the impact the tremendous increase in students would have on the school system. (See Hosier v. Evans, 1970)
In the mid 1960’s, for the first time in the 20th century, Native Virgin Islanders became a minority in their homeland. There were other impacts, some positive and some negative, of the demographic changes of the 1960’s. The V.I. experienced an economic boom like it has never seen either before or since. The government had surpluses in many of those years. Construction boomed. Tourist arrivals and spending increased. Real estate sales grew exponentially. Virgin Islanders grew a large “middle class”. Healthcare improved. Roads improved, etc. However, in spite of all these gains, Virgin Islanders lost their home. What had been primarily a home to natives, now was transformed (in less than one quarter of a generation), into an American playground and a place where the majority of people, were immigrants. Many of these persons had come to these islands principally for economic gain. Their contributions were invaluable to the economic boom of the 1960’s. Most natives in hindsight are thankful for their presence. Nevertheless, only a minority of immigrants seemed genuinely interested in unifying with all of the people, and developing a sense of community or nationalism. The rest were too busy making money, much of which was sent out of these islands as remittances.
Because of the ill treatment many had received by some natives, and by the federal government, former immigrants created benevolent associations. These organizations provided assistance not only to resident immigrants who were mistreated, but also to their relatives “back home” whether home meant the mainland U.S., the Caribbean or other parts of the world.
Now one might assume that natives led a large, well organized, discriminatory movement similar to what occurred by the Ku Klux Klan and other racists mostly in the southern United States. Such was not the case. In fact, immigrants who were “bonded”, left for the U.S. when they were not supposed to and natives who had sponsored them or loaned them money, experienced losses.
As the 1960’s, came to an end, the traditional ethos of Virgin Islanders changed as well. Many persons went from being community oriented and other-directed, (living in the “big yard”, or in “long-row” homes, where a matriarch was always home to exert discipline on the wayward), to being experts in the ethic of individualism and materialism. Virgin Islanders lost the practice of the village raising the child as an essential facet of social discipline and control in their culture. It has been said over and over, (and I can personally attest to this), that when you walked on the street, regardless of whether it was on St. John, St. Thomas or St. Croix before the mid ‘60’s, there seemed to be a network of matriarchs watching you like “big brother”. If you did anything wrong or did not properly greet them when you passed their home or business, your parents were informed before you returned. Corporal punishment was swift and without any questions being asked. This was because there existed a great sense of trust that Virgin Islanders had in the integrity of these matriarchs. All who lived in a particular community were like an extended family, whether related by blood or not. If a matriarch did not know your first name, she definitely knew “to whom you belonged”, and could identify you as Miss ___’s child.
This means of social control reduced crime and kept communities together. Almost all of this and more of the pre 1960’s ethos were lost by the 1970’s. The new ethos of many Virgin Islanders mimicked aspects of North American culture that were invading their homeland and thrown in their faces daily. The tourism demonstration effect, the impact of television and other media, particularly from the United States, eroded the old and swept in this new ethos. Natives became preoccupied with trying to get the “Almighty Dollar” in order to engage in “conspicuous consumption”, and “keep up with the Jones’s”. They attempted to get every new product they saw on television. They seemed to forget the values that had preserved and protected them as a unified and proud people with a distinct culture, when they were poorer. Now they adopted some of the best but more of the worst characteristics of American culture, and the cultural complexion of the Virgin Islands experienced a face and body lift.
Today, natives are still trying to adjust and cope with the staggering results of this mammoth demographic increase along with the shift in their status from majority to minority and the adoption of a North American value system. Some of the other negative results of these changes were double-sessions in public schools, increased water shortages, electrical outages, greater impact on health and social services, roads, housing, increased crime, and the terrible treatment of immigrants from other Caribbean islands.
Our brothers and sisters from the rest of the Caribbean became the scapegoat for almost everything that was wrong in these islands, and were unfairly discriminated against as an unjustifiable reaction to their increasing numbers and the decreasing number of natives. Some Virgin Islanders felt threatened, became somewhat xenophobic but did not unite to protect and preserve their interests.
The above paragraphs may seem like a digression, but one cannot understand present day V.I. society without knowing, understanding and respecting the difference between pre and post 1960’s V.I. society and the impact of those massive changes from the perspective of natives. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, some natives began again to migrate to the U.S. Their presence in the population continued to dwindle and their culture and traditions started to disappear. All might have been lost had it not been for a few tradition bearers, who in spite of overwhelming odds, fought to preserve what semblance of pre-1960 culture they could remember. Every time a group of native people becomes extinct for whatever reason, all of the things, which they can contribute to the rich diversity of the human family, are lost.
The essence of this issue is first knowing and second accepting the existence of an endangered group of “people of” the Virgin Islands. The third part of this is respect. Once persons not only can do these things, but also see the value in doing so, then they can hopefully see the need for protection and preservation of this group in order that the “distinguishing character, and guiding beliefs” of this group and its culture, will survive and be promoted here in their homeland. You cannot say you want to preserve the culture and traditions of a people and not simultaneously acknowledge and respect the people as a distinct entity that also needs to be preserved. How can you have classical or traditional V.I. culture without the people from whom it emanated? This is the heart of the matter. To this end, laws have to be enacted in the constitution, and policies have to be implemented.
Native Virgin Islanders, who know and ground their research-based opinions in the knowledge and practice of their own ethos first and in the history of the U.S. and its relationships with territories second, have been called racist and un-American. This is what foments the unnecessary divisiveness. Supporting the preservation of native rights should not be divisive. This has to be even more important than doing the same when it comes to animals, plants and geographic areas. Areas that require special protection are called APC’s. A people who require the same consideration are called endangered natives. In other parts of the world, when natives start to disappear, special laws are enacted for their preservation. Instead of name-calling, let us work together to achieve mutual understanding and consensus in a way that respects all of our rights.
It has appeared from the discussions on talk shows and in editorials, that consensus means acknowledging and protecting the rights of every one but the native. Every time natives start to talk about their rights, they are brow-beaten by others, who sometimes understand neither them nor their history of oppression, colonization and current need to exercise self-determination without interference. Virgin Islanders must have the right to choose who will be invited to make important decisions along with them. This should be done at a minimum. If any group’s rights are to be accorded priority in the Virgin Islands, especially when it comes to respect and protection, it has to be the rights of the natives. How can the rights of the indigenes of a place be less important than those of immigrants, whether they are foreigners or U.S. citizens? In societies where native rights are ignored, the natives become extinct or are severely marginalized in every way in their own home. What comes to mind is the story of the camel that requested to be able to put a foot in a man’s tent to protect it from the cold. The man, being kind in nature agreed, but as the night wore on, the camel kept on asking for more and more space. The man gave in until the camel eventually took over the tent and the man to whom the tent was home, found himself placed out in the cold. This man must have been a Native Virgin Islander, because part of the pre-1960 ethos of Virgin Islanders, involved treating others better than they treated themselves.
This story is very relevant to the Native Virgin Islander dilemma. As such, it is time for Natives to learn from the painful lessons of their history. Some persons who come here act like the camel. They get upset when natives tell them that they do not have the same right to exercise decisions of self-determination and self-government here as much as the native does. In some instances, these persons even feel that they have more rights. Since they came from America, which owns these islands as property, and since they have “their 14th amendment” American citizenship, these persons may feel that these facts give them as much or even more right to be here than the native, since natives are not 14th amendment citizens, and are merely part of the property that the U.S. owns. None of them will ever put it in such stark terms. They will couch their views and justifications in all kinds of euphemisms such as freedom, democracy, 14th amendment equal protection rights and protections, etc. As discussed in a previous article, when viewed from the perspective of our colonizers, especially regarding citizenship, they are right. However, when viewed from the perspective of natives, which makes these matters questions of self-determination and self-government, they are wrong. We must be able to come to some sensible compromise on these issues where the rights of everyone are respected, but with priority accorded to the historical context of oppression and colonialism experienced by the natives. This hopefully can be done without persons getting upset. However, we must not be afraid of emotions as long as they are guided by reason.
From the perspective of the United States, Virgin Islanders and their homeland are viewed constitutionally as mere property that it owns. I thought that the slave trade had ended 200 years ago, and that slavery in these islands ended in 1848. I probably am wrong, but I cannot see myself being overjoyed with being considered as property. Recently, Virgin Islanders observed the 90th anniversary of the “sale of these islands and their people” to the U.S. Yes we have made much progress under U.S. rule, but none of it was willingly granted. Our foremothers and fathers had to struggle and endure many trials and tribulations to eke out what semblance of “self-government” exists here. (If you have the delusion that we have true self-government, simply examine Section 8 of the Revised Organic Act of 1954, or review the history of unilateral changes that the U.S. has made to laws and regulations here. in order to become disillusioned. Sometimes these changes have adversely affected the people of these islands). The most recent examples were the changes that affected the EDC beneficiaries and the restrictions on fishing. This may be why the source of U.S. governmental authority over this territory, even after 90 years of U.S. colonial rule, still is the pejorative Territorial Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which gives Congress full control over territory and property. (A careful reading of this clause will reveal that “Territory” means property). (See the citation below.)
“ The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States (...)”
Why isn’t Congressional authority over the V.I. located under Article I, where most of the powers of Congress are outlined? The same occurs with the District Courts. Authority over them comes from Article IV, instead of Article III. The difference is degrading in terms of independence, salary and tenure for District Court judges here. Therefore, Virgin Islanders are treated as property, and their sustained right to U.S. citizenship at birth may be tenuous at best. Remember Supreme Court Justice Brown said that unincorporated territories like the V.I. are “appurtenant to, but not a part of the United States…”. Sometimes natives feel that their friends and officials from the U.S. mainland act as though Virgin Islanders really are personal property just as a dog or a cat are the personal property of their owners. If this is the mentality of the persons who criticize natives for wanting to be treated as free humans, then I understand their reasoning, even though I totally disagree with it.
Being American does not have to mean what Arthur Schlesinger meant by it in “The Disuniting of America”. He wanted it to mean that all persons were to melt into some pot and lose the cultural distinctiveness they brought to this country. His analysis of the dangers of focusing too much on our racial and ethnic differences as retarding national unity, however, is accurate and very relevant to the V.I. situation. His melting pot concept only was applicable when America was considered to be a “white” country, where only Caucasians were the de-facto authentic citizens. Non-whites could never hope to “melt” in Mr. Schlesinger’s racial and ethnic pot. Their physical characteristics would always stand out and make them visually distinct from the majority of the Caucasian population. Thus, only the whites had the option legitimately “melting” into the pot.
Some persons still think that this is how America is supposed to be. However, it is not. Just like this cannot happen in the Virgin Islands, the time for this definition of being American has gone and has now evolved to mean subscribing to the ethos of the founding fathers with one key distinction. We the people must now mean all of the people. Being American today is like being part of a tossed salad. The new paradigm in the Virgin Islands just as in the U.S. must now be that all cultural groups are invited here, and while retaining elements of their cultural distinctiveness, they also need to subscribe to, respect and identify with the cultural traditions of Virgin Islanders. This may just be the win-win answer to unity in the Virgin Islands. This “tossed salad” concept is more nutritious and respectful than the melting pot). Food that has been melted has been denatured, and most of the essential live-giving properties have been destroyed. If the pot itself melts, whatever is in it will be poisoned. Is this what we want for our peoples and cultures? A tossed salad retains all of the life-giving properties of its constituent parts, while making a whole. However, the lettuce, which provides the foundation, is the main ingredient. The natives, their history, traditions and aspirations are the lettuce in the Virgin Islands’ tossed salad society. You do not have an authentic, traditional tossed salad without lettuce as the base.
Possibly, due to their belief in the assimilative or American melting pot theory, some of our friends do not even want to acknowledge the existence of the native people of the Virgin Islands, who have a distinct ethos that is rapidly disappearing. All they see is “America” and the American ethos here. They see little value in preserving Johnny cake and maufe. Believe it or not, I partially agree. It is not only the physical manifestations of a culture and a people that constitute their ethos. It is principally their values, the basis for them and the left and right brain processes they used to produce the excellent material products of their culture, notwithstanding the limitations imposed upon them by slavery and colonization. Probably the greatest aspect of our culture, is the way we think and solve problems, which is also inextricably intertwined with our language and other important non-material aspects of our culture. The physical manifestations could change, but when the non-material intellectual and spiritual ones disappear, the culture begins to decay and eventually may become extinct.
Anyhow, as far as some mainland V.I. residents are concerned, Virgin Islanders should be viewed as a monolithic group of assimilated Americans living here. Other than a few superficial expressions of our traditions, here should become a carbon copy of “downtown” America. Students of history like me should deny their education, forget this divisive, discriminatory foolishness about ethos and native rights, and simply just get along.
Get along according to whose definitions, worldview, ethos and most importantly, whose interests? Even in my former labor union, the charter members have more privileges than the members who came after; regardless of how long they serve in the union, how many strikes they have endured, etc. Special consideration is always given to those pioneers who endured the rigors of forming an organization. They are able to attend all functions freely and are recognized for their ground-breaking work. Why can’t the persons who are not the charter members of V.I. society, or their descendants understand and accept this principle?
One thing that the 1960’s taught conscious Africans living in this part of the world is that in order to survive, you must clearly unite, organize, define yourself and your interests for yourself, based on the specific context provided by your worldview, history, culture and other circumstances. As Professor Janice Hale of Clark University once wrote, “The power to define is the power to destroy.” You then need to find likeminded persons to help in the attainment of these interests. I wonder how many of us would even consider telling a Jew to forget his history, especially the holocaust and simply try to get along with the descendants of Nazis since they might be ideologically against what their forefathers promoted under Hitler? If the holocaust of Jews, which entitled them to receive reparations can be respected, why can’t the hundreds of years of African holocausts similarly be recognized, respected and the descendants similarly compensated by ensuring their ability to not only survive, but also succeed and prosper in their homeland? Who is betraying a racial motive now? Until this kind of respect and sensitivity for the people of the Virgin Islands as an endangered group with a distinct and dying ethos, is shown, there can be no hope for consensus and unity.
As one enlightened African philosopher has said, you cannot have peace without justice. Justice is a pre-condition and must include the recognition of the existence of the Native Virgin Islander as a group that should be protected and preserved at all cost. When this is done, then and only then can we collaborate and pursue peaceful coexistence.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)